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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The period from 1900 to 1914 is generally accepted to have been one 
of great optimism about the progress of man and society. Most people 
believed that the world was steadily improving and that whatever perils 
lay in the future could certainly be overcome. War was felt to be un­
likely even though the period had more than its share of imperialism, 
nationalism, and increasing armaments . All of the great technological 
inventions only served to remind most people that man had indeed pro­
gressed. Beginning in 1914 this feeling of well-being would be shatter­
ed as many of the technological improvements would become instruments of 
death and destruction for many millions of men. 
Such a shift from an age of optimism to mass destruction on a glo­
bal scale had an extremely profound effect upon the intellectuals and 
thinkers of the time . Their writings reflect the disillusionment apparent 
in their thought as the world of optimism came tumbling down around them. 
Thus the war became a great watershed in the history of thought as the 
great technological strides made in the early years of the century became 
adapted to warfare. 
This thesis will present a survey of the major British thinkers of 
the time as they grappled with the problems wrought by the war and the 
culmination of those problems in the peace, as well as their effect on 
man and the human condition. 
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As the thinkers and the optimists tried to make the post-war world 
a better place in which to live , the avengers and the pessimists sought 
a harsh punishment for the defeated powers. Thus the Versailles Treaty 
became a focal point for intellectual opposition as the avengers held 
out for their sadistic demands. The quandary became apparent when the 
negotiators had to determine what type of treaty they wanted. The 
choice was between the ideal versus the real--juste milieu versus revanche. 
The main protagonists at Versailles were Wilson pushing for the idealistic 
aims as delineated in the Fourteen Points and Clemenceau, occasionally 
backed by Lloyd-George , who opted for harsher punishments to be meted out 
against Germany . The result of this conflict is well known. 
Finally, there was the League of Nations . In its initial conception 
it was to be perhaps the answer to the problem of preventing war in the 
modern age. As it turned out, it was nothing more than an impotent body 
desirous of peace. The British intellectuals had very definite views on 
what the League should and could be as well as what it actually became . 
Thus the purpose of this thesis is to determine the views of certain 
British intellectuals and writers by studying their writings and British 
journals of opinion. Since Great Britain in the 1920 ' s  housed a great 
many brilliant minds, a selection of intellectual figures had to be made 
in order to best ascertain what the intellectuals thought concerning the 
war, its outcome as portrayed by the Treaty of Versailles, and the League 
of Nations. 
The first major task is to determine what is meant by the term in­
tellectual . Here two differentiations �ust be made: the first between 
the concepts of intelligence and intellect ;  and the second between British 
3 
and American intellectuals. Richard Hofstadter in his Anti-Intellec-
tualism in American Life states that in America the term intellect is 
frequently used as an epithet while the term intelligence never is. 
The concept of intelligence is thus viewed as an esteemed quality while 
intellect is seen as ·something else entirely. To quote Hofstadter 
"whereas intelligence seeks to grasp , manipulate, re-order , adjus t ,  in­
tellect examines , ponders, wonders , theorizes , criticizes, imagines". 1 
Perhaps it can be said that practicality is the key to the understanding 
of the fundamental distinctions between the two . Intelligence is 
viewed , at least in the American culture, as something that can be put 
to a practical use. A person with intellect also has intelligence but 
uses the gift in a less than_practical manner . Hofstadter uses the com-
parison between Thomas A. Edison, the great inventive genius, and Josiah 
Willard Gibbs , the man who laid the theoretical foundations for modern 
physical chemistry. While Edison became a legend in his own time , Gibbs 
2 was scarcely recognized. Edison's inventions had practical uses 
while Gibbs's accomplishments were in the field of pure research. This 
is the important distinction. 
To determine exactly what an intellectual is one must define the 
terms involved . There are several interesting definitions of what the 
term intellectual means but two of the best come from Richard Hofstadter 
and Arthur M. Schlesinger , Jr . Hofstadter points out that much of the 
work of a culture--that work done by lawyers , doctors, professors , and 
!Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York: 
Alfred A. Knop f ,  1962), p .  25 . 
2Ibid . ,  pp. 25-26. 
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engineers--is done by people dependent upon ideas . This, however, is 
not enough to make that work distinctively intellectual. To Hofstadter, 
these professional men live off ideas, not for them. 3 Thus the man who 
lives for ideas can be termed an intellectual . This living for ideas 
involves to a certain degree the assumption of the role of skeptic in a 
society . The true intellectual does not accept things as they are but 
seeks to change those things that are not as they should be. George 
Bernard Shaw ' s  observation that "some men see things as they are and 
say why--I dream things that never were and say why not" is the defini-
tive statement about the true role of the intellectual in society, a 
person who tries to make things ever better. 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , holds a view that differs only slightly. 
It differs mainly in the seemingly more American pragmatic sense. Sctile-
:Singer · applies the use of power to the determination of intellectuality. 
To Schlesinger, an intellectual is that man who is at home in the world of 
4 ideas as opposed to the man who is at home in the world of power . The 
intellectual's inhospitality to the realm of power can be compared to 
Hofstadter ' s  view of the intellectual ' s  role as that of the skeptic . The 
very use of the term skeptic implies one who is somehow outside the main-
stream of society . This does not mean that the intellectual has to be 
totally divorced from the world of power, however. The backbenchers in 
the British Parliament are those members of the opposition party who are 
skeptical or critical of the direction in which the party in power is 
3Bofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, pp . 26-27 . 
4Arthur M .  Schlesinger, Jr . ,  The Crisis of Confidence (Boston:  
Boughton-Mifflin , 1969), p .  44. 
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going. John Maynard Keynes is a good example of an intellectual who 
worked in close conjunction with men in power without actually being in 
power himself. This is fairly obvious when one views the treatment of 
Germany after the war and then compares that treatment to Keynes ' s  opin­
ions on the subject. 
The second differentiation which must be made concerning the de­
finition of intellectuality is the difference between American and 
British intellectuals . American intellectuals historically have been 
viewed as being something less than patriotic . This feeling arose from 
the innate skepticism inherent in the thought of the intellectual . 
Hofstadter ' s  Anti-Intellectualism in American Life is really a history 
of the mistreatment and misunderstanding of the American intellectual 
by the American public. 
An entirely different situation is apparent in Great Britain. There 
intellectuals are well treated and their opinions are held with some 
respect. 5 Thus a study of their views and opinions lends some insight 
into the thinking of the country as a whole. If such is the case in the 
present day there is no reason for believing that the same will not hold 
true for the past. This paper will not attempt to draw conclusions of 
this sort but will only present the views held by those selected British 
intellectuals . 
The following intellectuals have been selected as being representa­
tive of intellectual thought in England as a whole in the wartime period . 
Those selected--George Bernard Shaw, H . G .  Wells , John Maynard Keynes ,  
5Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism, p .  424. 
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Bertrand Russell, G . K. Chesterton, G .  Lowes Dickinson, H . N .  Brailsford 
and Austin Harrison--fit this image very well . A perusal of the British 
journals of opinion also turns up men who can be considered intellec-
tuals,  albeit they are less known than their internationally famous 
colleagues already mentioned. 
This study is important because it is difficult to understand why 
the British intellectuals thought the way they did while their country 
was involved in a terrible war. If, however, the intellectuals are seen 
as operating within their own distinct climate of opinion the issue be-
comes clearer. Woodrow Wilson, a definite� avis in the American 
atmosphere ,  becomes much easier to understand as part of this British 
climate of opinion. 
To better understand this term climate of opinion, a definition is 
in order. The term climate of opinion was restored to general usage by 
Alfred North Whitehead, the eminent philosopher. Carl Becker, the 
American historian, describes it in his 1932 work The Heavenly City of 
the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers. Stated simply, a climate of opinion 
is an environment in which certain preconceptions, ideas , and ideals are 
held as true without proof. Becker uses the example of Dante and Thomas 
Aquinas discussing with us their concepts of a league of nations and 
natural law. Their replies would be unintelligible to us because their 
answers would be cast with regard to their medieval climate of opinion. 
What is arrived at then is the idea that "whether arguments command assent 
or not depends less upon the logic that conveys them than upon the climate 
6 of opinion in which they are sustained" . 
6carl Becker . 
phers (New Haven : 
The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philoso­
Yale University Press , 1932), p .  S. 
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The climate of opinion at work in Great Britain during the war was 
a holdover from Victorian liberalism. This liberalism had a certain 
amount of idealism involved , as any type of liberalism must for it 
stresses what should be but is not. Bertrand Russell's Non-Conscription 
Fellowship during the stormy period of the war is a notable example of 
this mixture of liberalism and idealism. It is extremely idealistic to 
be against conscription, and demonstrate against it , while your nation 
is fighting for its very life against a very strong enemy . 
Thus the intellectuals of Great Britain viewed the war just as 
Woodrow Wilson did, as a war to end all wars. What Wilson suffered at 
the hands of Lloyd George, Clem�nceau, and the American Senate the Bri­
tish intellectuals also suffered. The only difference was that they saw 
it coming while Wilson did not. What eventually killed the president 
only made the intellectuals' bitterness increase. 
Before entering into any discussion of the views of these intellec­
tuals it is important to study their backgrounds in order to shed some 
light on how they arrived at their conclusions . 
George Bernard Shaw was born in Dublin on July 26,  1856 , the son of 
a minor civil servant. In 1898 his energies began to be concentrated on 
drama. Shortly afterwards he was made drama critic of the Saturday Review . 
He became involved with Sidney and Beatrice Webb and became an active 
socialis t ,  thus automatically relegating himself to the role of skeptic in 
British society. Even his plays took on a highly polemical tone. 
His works on the war and its aftermath are extremely important for an 
understanding of his temper during this perio�. Common Sense About the 
War was published in November 1914 as a supplement to the New Statesman 
8 
which he had helped found in 19lj, The most important work for this 
paper was Shaw ' s  What .!. Really Wrote About the War published in 1931 
as a compilation of all his wartime writings. The true impact of Shaw's 
thought is readily apparent here. Although not normally a passionate or 
emotional man, Shaw ' s  anger and disillusionment is reflected in these 
writings . 
Herbert George Wells, better known as H . G. Wells , was born on 
September 21, 1866, at Bromley, Kent . He graduated from London Univer­
sity in 1888 and in 1895 he wrote his first novel The Time Machine. The 
work was an immediate success and so he continued to write works in the 
same vein producing, The Wonderful Visit in 1895 ; The Island of Doctor 
Moreau in 1896; The Invisible Man in 1897 ; The War of the.Worlds in 1898 ; 
The First Men in the Moon in 1901; and The Food of the Gods in 1904. 
Wells ' s  talents did not lie only in the realm of science fiction, 
however. He was animated with a passionate concern for man and society. 
This was reflected by his turn from fantasy to more realistic comedy , 
usually portraying lower middle-class life. Drawing upon his own earlier 
experiences Wells became the spokesman for the frustrated and the inarti­
culate. He viewed the advent of the war as evidence of the decline of 
man and society as a whole. Man could progress only if he adapted him­
self to his changing environment . The onset of World War II proved to 
Wells that man was not succeeding in adapting. He died a broken and dis­
appointed man on August 13,  1946. 
John Maynard Keynes was born June 5, 1883 , at Cambridge where he was 
later educated as a mathema�ician. After studying economics Keynes was 
employed by the civil service in India in 1906. Returning to Cambridge 
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in 1908 as a lecturer he remained there until 1915 when he took a post 
in the British treasury. In 1919 Keynes found himself as a senior 
official at Versailles for the peace conference. He was in total dis-
. agreement with the severity of the reparations demands to be imposed 
upon Germany and resigned from his post. It was at this time that he 
wrote The Economic Consequences of the Peace, his most important work. 
As a result of his resignation and subsequent book, Keynes became 
a public figure, continually embroiled in the economic controversies of 
the day . As an economist Keynes was without equal . His views in The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace were finally followed after ten years 
of economic catastrophe in Germany and his later work, The General 
Theory of Employment , Interest and Money (1936) , formed the basis of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt ' s  economic recovery programs . 
When World War II broke out Keynes wrote How To Pay for the War 
(1940) which proposed a means .for controlling inflation. He was an ex­
tremely important figure in British wartime finance and negotiated a 
large U . S .  loan to Great Britain. He died in.Sussex on April 21, 1946 . 
Bertrand Russell was born on May 18 , 1872 and was destined to be­
come a noted philosopher and mathematician. In some circles his cham­
pionship of individual liberty makes him comparable to Voltaire in the 
eighteenth century and John Stuart Mill in the nineteenth century. His 
major scholarly work, Principia �athematica, written in collaboration 
with Alfred North Whitehead, was published �n three volumes in 1910, 
1912, and 1913.  It was with the coming of the war that Russell ' s  concern 
for individual liberty became apparent. 
When war broke out Russell became an active member in the No Con-
10 
scription Fellowship as well as becoming a member of the executive 
committee of the Union of Democratic Control, the latter being a group 
made up of opponents to the war. Russell was fined one hundred pounds 
as the author of a pamphlet criticizing the severity of a two year 
sentence meted out to a conscientious obj ector. When Russell refused 
to pay the fine his library was seized and he was later deprived of his 
lectureship at the university because of his anti-war activities. The 
governmental harassment continued when Russell was offered a post in 
America at Harvard but was refused a passport. This did not deter him 
however. Russell continued to speak and write against the war and con-
scription until he received a six month j ail sentence in 1918 for a 
pacifist article he had written. In the 1960 ' s  Russell was still de-
monstrating against war and continued nuclear testing • 
. 
G .  Lowes Dickinson was an economist and political scientist who lee-
tured at King' s  College, Cambridge, and the London School of Economics 
and Political Science. He was a pacifist and an early member of the 
Union of Democratic Control. He authored many books dealing with poli-
tical science, history , and philosophy . 
Henry Noel Brailsford , an author and j ournalis t ,  was born in Mir-
field, York, in 187 3 .  He was educated at Glasgow University where he 
received an M.A. Degree with Philosophical and Classical Honours .  After 
graduation Brailsford was the lead-writer successively for the Manchester 
Guardian, the Tribune , the Daily News , and Nation. His other credentials 
include membership of the Carnegie International Conunission in the Balkans 
in 1913 and he was a member of the executive committee of the Union of 
Democratic Control. 
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Gilbert Keith Chesterton was born May 29, 1874, at Campden Hill, 
Kensington, and was baptized as a member of the Church of England . His 
background was typical of a member of the English middle class. His 
father was a Liberal with relatively strong ties to traditionalism. This 
traditionalism along with a dogmatic mind led Chesterton to convert to 
Roman Catholicism. In politics Chesterton ref erred to himself as a re­
luctant Socialist being of the opinion that there were only two choices , 
capitalism or socialism. 
At the time of the Boer War Chesterton found himself aligned with 
the pacifists as he and they both hated the war . Chesterton, however , was 
not a pacifist but was merely pro-Boer. This alliance with the cause of 
Britain ' s  enemy becomes rather difficult t o  understand when Chesterton' s  
views on World War I are studied . He took a completely opposite view 
than did most of the intellectuals , defending the British and damning the 
Germans unceasingly. So adept was he at this profession that he was 
called to write for Wellington House,  the Propaganda Ministry .  His writ­
ings show why he was chosen for the assignment . 
CHAPTER TWO 
Opinions About The War 
On June 28 , 1914 , Gavrilo Princip stepped out of the shadows of a 
street in Sarajevo. Serbia, and into the pages of history when he assas­
sinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the heirs to the 
throne of the Austrian Empire, One month later Austria declared war on 
Serbia, followed on August 1 and August 3 by German declarations of war 
on Russia and France. Great Britain entered the war on August 4 and 
World War I was officially under way. All the years of diplomatic jockey­
ing, threats and counter-threats were ended. Now everything was rele­
gated to that final instrument of diplomacy--force, 
Germany ' s  invasion of Belgium is generally accepted as the cause of 
Great Britain ' s  entry into the war. The mightiest naval power in the 
world could not stand by and watch gallant little Belgium be crushed be­
neath the armed might of the German Huns . And so amid great rej oicing 
and celebration, the world went to war . 
All British intellectuals were appalled by some aspect of the war. 
Gilber ·t Keith Chesterton was disgusted by Germany ' s  actions while the 
rest of the intellectuals dealt with in this paper were appalled by the 
war itself . Chesterton will be dealt with first as he seems to be the 
most enigmatic of the intellectuals s tudied in this paper. 
Chesterton published his first major work on the war The Barbarism 
of Berlin in 1914. Here he pointed out that one of the key words of the 
12 
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war was the word barbarian. The Prussians had applied it to the Russians; 
the Prussians had applied it to the British and the French; now Chesterton 
in the name of England was applying it to the Germans and was s triving to 
prove that they deserved the title. 7 Chesterton stated that when the 
German referred to the Russian as barbarian , he used the term in the 
sense of imperfectly civilized and that when the British and French called 
the Prussians barbarians the term was used to denote an enemy of civiliza-
8 tion. This to Chesterton was a much more telling epithet and one that 
the Germans rightly deserved. 
According to Chesterton, the Prussian exhibited many characteris-
tics of barbarism. For example, the Prussian was totally incapable of 
reciprocity--the give and take of civilized lif e--because he was intellec­
tually incapable of this thought. 9 This Chesterton viewed as the maj or 
threat to Europe and the world--the Prussian ' s  inability to live as a 
societal creature. The Prussian lacked shyness ,  that is , the tact, dip-
lomacy, and good taste needed to get along in the world. Chesterton 
succinctly stated that the Prussian was an animal who "eats and makes love 
10 noisily". 
Since the Prussian did not follow any of the normal customs and mores 
of civilized life, it would be fairly obvious that the Prussian would be a 
liar too. Chesterton stated that the Prussian would do anything to achieve 
]·Gilbert Keith Chesterton, The Barbarism of Berlin ( London: Cassell 
and Co . ,  Ltd. , 1914), p .  26 .  
81bid . ,  pp . 28-29 . 
9 Ibid . ,  p .  41.  
lOibid . , p .  90. 
14 
his goals, including lying . Chesterton set up a comic calendar of how 
events could have gone . It showed the difficulty of a civilized country 
when dealing with an unscrupulous barbarian. 
July 24:  Germany invades Belgium. 
July 25:  England declares war. 
July 26:  Germany promises not to annex Belgium if England 
withdraws from the war .  
July 27 : England withdraws from the war. 
July 28: Germany annexes Belgium. England declares war. 
July 29:  Germany promises not to annex France. England withdraws 
from the war . 
July 30 : Germany annexes France. England declares war . 
July 31 :  Germany promises not to annex England . 
August 1 :  England withdraws from the war. Germany invades 
England. 11 
The fact that the Prussians were inveterate liars did not bother 
Chesterton so much as their crime of the calculated misuse of the educa-
tional system to achieve desired ends.  Not even the professors were immune 
to the callous nationalism spewed forth by the government. They used their 
talents to "prove whatever the government wanted them to prove, and the 
worst part was that they did it willingly." 
If the English had been on the German side, the German 
professors would have noted what irresistible energies had 
evolved the Teutons. As the English are on the other side, 
the German professors will say that these Teutons were not 
sufficiently evolved, or they will say that they were not 
Teutons . Probably they will say both. But the truth is 
that all they call evolution should rather be called evasion. 
They tell us they are opening windows of enlightenment and 
doors of progress . The truth is that they are breaking up 
11chesterton, Barbarism .£!.. Berlin, pp. 10-11. 
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the whole house of human intellect, that they may abscond 
in any direction. There is an ominous and almost monstrous 
parallel between the position of their over-rated philoso­
phers and of their comparatively under-rated soldiers . For 
what their professors call roads of progress are really 
routes of escape. 12 
Chesterton became even more incensed and derogatory toward Germany 
in his 1915 work The Appetite .£f Tyranny. This work dealt more with the 
defects in the Prussian character, those defects which make the Prussian 
a true barbarian. Chesterton pointed out that two facts were well-known 
in the civilized world . 'UE..fi:rst":is that Prussia is a second-rate country 
and the second is that to any Prussian, Prussia is first-rate and is 
ready to allow the rest of the world to take advantage of the glory 
that is Prussia . 13 
This preoccupation with the Prussian deficiencies in character is 
carried over to include all Germans . Chesterton saw Prussia as the root 
of the evil in Germany which lowers all Germans to the level of dogs and 
14 negroes who have no reactions . Because the Germans allowed this Prus-
s ian spirit to overtake them and then wallow in it , all Germans are 
stupid and mad, failing in everything except being stupid enough to carry 
out their insane culture . When they fail in this respect they must re-
15 sort to a brutal obedience, that is , to force their culture on others . 
Chesterton did admit to some strong points in the Prussian character: 
12chesterton, Barbarism of Berlin, pp. 94-95. 
13Gilbert Keith Chesterton, The Appetite of Tyranny (New York: Dodd , 
Mead and Co. , 1915) , p .  95. 
14Ibid . ,  pp . 110-111. 
15Ibid . ,  pp. 100-101 .  
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failure in honor, egomania, the itch for tyranny, mental shapelessness , 
and a potential infinity for excuses . 16 Some of the Prussian strong 
points were best exhibited in the Imperial proclamations admitting and 
justifying atrocities for their fright value. The admitted purpose of 
these atrocities was to terrify civilian populations . But the Kaiser 
was not too proud to write to President Wilson to complain that the 
British were using dum-dum bullets.17 
Chesterton realized that Germany presented a very great threat to 
the peace of Europe as well as to the peace of the world. He also knew 
that Europe had to be the agent through which the Germans must be stop-
ped. All the energy of Europe had to be put forth to stop Prussia be-
cause the Prussian would continue to do things,  as a maniac does , until 
he is forced to stop. 18 
Chesterton ' s  strong religious background is reflected in his third 
book on the war , . The Crimes of England, published in 1916. Here Chester-
ton portrays Germany ' s  invasion of Belgium as an anti-religious crusade 
begun by the heathen Huns . 
The s tatics of non-combatants killed and tortured by 
this time only s tun the imagination. But two friends of 
my own have been in villages sacked by the Prussian march. 
One saw a tabernacle containing the Sacrament patiently 
picked out in pattern by shot after shot. The other saw a 
rocking-horse and the wooden toys in a nursery laboriously 
hacked to pieces. Those two facts together will be enough to
19  satisfy some of  us of the name of  the spirit that had passed. -
16chesterton, Appetite of Tyranny, pp. 93-94. 
17Ibid . ,  pp. 43-44. 
18Ibid . ,  p .  109. 
19G.K .  Chesterton, The Crimes of England (New York: John Lane Co . ,  
1916) , p .  160. 
17 
The Prussian infinity for excuses mentioned earlier is discussed in 
this work as a result of the sinking of the Lusitania. The Germans were 
not even able to stick to one story. Chesterton saw five possible 
stories the Germans could use to rationalize the ship ' s  demise. First, 
the Germans could declare that the Lusitania was a troop-ship subject to 
the laws of war. Secondly, they could state that it was an unlawful 
munitions carrier, again subject to sinking by an enemy vessel. Thirdly , 
the Germans could say that the passengers had been sufficiently warned of 
the danger of travelling on ships of the enemy in war-time ( as was in-
deed the case) . Fourthly, the Germans could declare that there were 
guns on board the Lusitania which were about to be fired at the submarine, 
thus making the sinking a clear case of self defense.  Finally and some-
what sardonically, Chesterton suggested that the Germans could say that 
the British sank the ship in order to make a stronger case for American 
entry into the war. 20 Thus Chesterton in effect begins the revisionism 
of the causes for American entry into the war by listing the various 
propositions used later by historians to explain the reason for the sink-
ing of the Lusitania. 
Chesterton defends Great Britai n ' s  entry into the war in a letter to 
a fictional German professor, Doctor Whirlwind. The letter was written 
in reply to the German charges of British crimes. Chesterton explains the 
real crimes of England. 
I have therefore thought it advisable to provide you 
with a catalogue of the real crimes of England; and I have 
selected them on a principle which cannot fail to interest 
20chesterton, Crimes of England, pp . 12-14 . 
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and please you. On many occasions we have been very wrong 
indeed. We were very wrong indeed when we took part in 
preventing Europe from putting a term to the impious 
piracies of Frederick the Great • • • •  We were very wrong in­
deed when we allowed the peaceful king of Denmark to be 
robbed in broad daylight by a brigand named Bismarck; and 
when we allowed the Prussian swash-bucklers to enslave 
and silence the French provinces which they could neither 
govern nor persuade • • • •  We were very wrong indeed when we 
praised the soulless Prussian education and copied the 
soulless Prussian laws,21 
Thus Chesterton disregarded any discussion of German innocence in the 
war. In this regard he was definitely odds with George Bernard Shaw. 
George Bernard Shaw ' s  views on the war differed markedly from those 
of Gilbert Keith Chesterton. While Chesterton was dogmatic and tradition-
al. Shaw was somewhat of a radical and non-conformist .  Shaw did not like 
modern capitalist society and so could not wholeheartedly support the 
British and French war effor t .  On the other hand the Hohenzollerns were 
too militaristic for his taste so Shaw could not really support them 
either. He saw the warring countries as two pirate fleets preparing for 
battle. Since Shaw was on one of the fleets it was important to him 
which side won but this in no way altered the fact that both sides were 
pirates. As Shaw himself put it "All the ensigns were Jolly Rogers; but 
22 mine was clearly the one with the Union Jack in the corner". 
Thus Shaw ' s  voice became a voice of reason �peaking out amid a 
clamor of unreasonable men. He believed that the war s.hould not be based 
on racial or national characteristics since the war was between govern-
ments , not people. Shaw was distressed at the propaganda being put forth 
2lchesterton, Crimes of England , pp . 25-26. 
22George Bernard Shaw, What .!. Really Wrote About the War (New York: 
Brentano ' s ,  1914) , p .  2 .  
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by his government portraying the Germans as nothing better than blood-
thirsty, rapacious tyrants led by the Junkers who were bent on world 
domination. Shaw pointed out that most Englishmen did not really know 
what a Junker was . To most Englishmen a Junker was a German officer 
with bad manners and a nasty habit of cutting down innocent civilians 
with his sabre. This was the definition used by the propaganda people 
at Wellington House. Shaw took his definition from the Encyclopadisches 
Worterbuch which defined Junker as a young nobleman, younker, lording, 
23 country squire, or country gentleman. With this definition in mind 
Shaw stated that there was not any real difference between a Junker 
and an English country gentleman. Most Englishmen were hard put to be-
lieve this , especially the country gentlemen. 
Having pointed out that Germans are no different than Englishmen, 
Shav then went ?n to say that the propaganda and legends of crime used 
to inf lame the public indignation must be discarded if peace is to be 
restored. The facts must be put in order by separating what is true from 
what is false. 24 
Since one of the maj or causes of the war according to most English-
men was the German invasion of neutral Belgium, Shaw discussed this first 
as his first strike to show the foolishness and stupidity of the war. 
The basis for all of Shaw ' s  writings was his belief that the entire con-
cept of neutrality was absurd with international law being as vague as 
it was. According to international law a neutral state is one which does 
23shaw, What ..!_Wrote, p .  20 . 
24 Ibid . ,  P• 256 .  
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not participate in a war which is in progress and treats the belli-
gerents impartially . Neutrality gives no assurance that the neutral 
25 will not enter the war nor be attacked. Great Britain used the 
violation of Belgian neutrality as a ploy t o  try to get the United 
States into the war . Shaw stated that Great Britain had an agreement 
to come to the aid of France even if Belgium were not invaded. This 
was not really the case but Shaw believed it to be so. Thus , Belgium 
had to resist the invasion in order to make the impact on public op-
inion more forceful . It would have been more logical, and certainly 
more intelligent, to allow the Germans free passage through the country . 26 
Since free passage was not forthcoming, Germany found it necessary to 
force her way through Belgium. Thus she was seen as the most evil 
country in the world. To read the British press one would assume that 
to.be so. Shaw, however, did not believe in the ipso facto guilt of 
Germany for the war and the destruction of Belgium. He felt that the 
Belgian claims had to be settled but that the Entente should share some 
of the cost of the restoration since it had had a hand in the destruc-
tion.27 
Since the conflict was already going on, Shaw had very definite 
views on how the war should be waged for the Allied side as well as for 
the Entente. His views on how the war should have been waged are impor-
tant because they set the stage for the peace which Shaw knew had to 
25vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (New York: Appleton­
Century-Crofts, 1966), p .  280. 
26shaw, What .!. Wrote, p .  98. 
2 7 Ibid • , p • 7 7 • 
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come someday. In order for that peace to be a lasting one the follow­
ing provisions had to be carried out. 
First ,  the war had to be pushed vigorously but not so vigorously so 
as to crush Germany between the Anglo-French combination and Russia. 
The end of the war had to come about as a result of the Anglo-French 
forces gaining a hegemony over Germany without the complete destruction 
of Germany . Any victory gained over Germany with Russian aid would 
mean the end of western European liberalism. Shaw showed a very de­
finite anti-Russian bias here. He believed that backward Russia had 
no business in the war at all and took great pleasure when Russia, 
having embarked on the Russian revolution, withdrew from the war. 
Second , Germany had to be driven out of Belgium as a means of re­
storing that country' s  territorial integrity. Since this was the sup­
posed reason why Great Britain entered the war, then the war should end 
when· Belgium was cleared . 
Third, war "as a school of character and a nurse of virtue, "  must 
be ended after this war. 28 Shaw believed that war had become something 
glorious when it should have been something to be feared and avoided. 
The celebrations greeting the announcements of the war were enough to 
convince Shaw of the viability of this point . 
S.haw became more specific , that is he dealt with more specific 
points , when he discussed the question of guilt in the war. He stated 
that neither England nor Germany should claim any moral superiority in 
negotiations at the end of the war . To Shaw , both sides were equally 
28shaw, What !. Wrote, p .  93. 
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guilty. 
Great Britain's basic claim for moral superiority over Germany 
rested on the belief that she had fulfilled treaty obligations to come 
to the aid of innocent Belgium as she lay helpless before the Hun in­
vasion. Shaw stated that the case against Germany for the violation of 
Belgium was of no moral value to Great Britain because she had allowed 
the violation of the Treaty of Paris by Russia (i. e., the violation of 
Black Sea neutrality) and the violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Aus­
tria ( i . e . , the seizure of Bosnia-Hexzegovina) without resorting to war. 
If Great Britain was so interested in the sanctity of treaties , Shaw 
asked, why did she not come out more forcefully when the treaties of 
Paris and Berlin were violated? It  is possible to agree with Shaw on 
this point as those who argued most vehemently for an immediate British 
response to the German invasion argued on the basis of the alleged 
natural inviolability of treaties . They drastically overstated their 
case; Shaw merely responded in like manner .  
The fact that the invasion of Belgium was used merely for propaganda 
purposes by Great Britain becomes more apparent with the knowledge that 
Great Britain would have defended France even without Belgium's invasion. 
In fact, the whole issue of Belgian neutrality was illusory . France and 
Great.Britain only stood to gain and Germany to lose if the German at­
tack were confined to the heavily fortified Franco-German border. If 
Belgium were invaded, Great Britain an<l France knew they would be in­
vited by the Belgians to enter the country. Thus Belgian neutrality 
worked only against Germany as it would be lifted to allow France and 
Great Britain in. 
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Shaw doubted that the 1839 Treaty of London was valid for use 
against Germany in 1 914 as it had been aimed originally at the French 
threat to Belgium. Even if the treaty ' s  validity were beyond ques­
tion, it is doubtful that its breach would constitute a casus belli. 29 
Shaw ' s  view on how Germany should have waged the war was most 
logical and realistic. The German military minds would probably have 
been appalled at such a suggestion as Shaw had for them. According to 
Shaw , Germany should have defended herself against Russia alone, not 
fearing a rear attack by Great Britain and France. If France had at-
tacked, Great Britain would not have been able to come to her aid as 
she would have been the aggressor, The French government would also 
have had a great deal of difficulty convincing its people of the 
necessity of a dangerous attack on Germany when Russia had been the 
aggressor in the first place . 30 
Instead Germany attacked France first , only incidentally violating 
Belgium on the way in. This gave the British militarists the excuse 
they needed to get involved. Shaw believed that Germany had made this 
stupid move because stupid men were involved. They viewed the war as 
a giant chess game; first France would be swept off the board and then 
the turn-about would be made to take care of Russia. 31 But the French 
defense was strong enough to check the German advance and history has 
recorded the rest of the game. 
29shaw , What ..!_ Wrote, pp . 93-94 . 
30Ibid. , p .  41. 
31Ibid. , p.  42. 
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Shaw not only wrote concerning how things should have been done 
but was also in the forefront striving to stop the war before it really 
got started. The 7 November 1914 issue of The Nation printed an open 
letter from George Bernard Shaw to the President of the United States. 32 
The letter petitioned President Wilson as head of the chief neutral 
power to invite the other neutral powers to confer with the United 
States to get Britain , France, and Germany out of Belgium and to make 
them fight out their quarrel on their own territories . The letter was 
a cogent appeal to a reasonable man to help Europe out of a most un­
reasonable time. 
Shaw saw how the ancient rules of war had changed under advancing 
technology. Men now fought and died to gain a few hundre� yards of 
worthless devastated ground which would be recaptured the next day by 
the enemy. Neutrality was a thing of the pas t ;  civilians had become 
tot�lly involved in the war effort , both as economic entities and as 
casualties. Shaw realized that this war was not the end of an era but 
the beginning and preview of worse terrors to come. Pessimistically 
Shaw wrote, "the next war , if permitted to occur, will be no 'sport of 
kings , '  no game of chance played with live soldiers and won by charging 
them into dead ones, but a scientific attempt to destroy cities and kill 
civilians . 1133 Twenty-one years later this prophecy was fulfilled. 
Perhaps the most visionary of the intellectuals was Herbert George 
Wells . For example, he wrote in 1916 that there would be no conclusive 
32see Appendix for full text of letter. 
33shaw, What ..! Wrote, p .  273 .  
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end to the war with a triumphal entry into London ,  Paris, Berlin, or 
Moscow but a negotiated peace between shattered powers. 34 This was 
an excellent assumption to be made as early as 1916. It is too bad 
that the assumption never became reality. True, there were no trium-
phal entries into any major city but neither was there a negotiated 
peace. What occurred was a dictated peace after a war in which there 
was no clear cut defeat for the German forces . They were retreating 
but there was no final crushing defeat. Instead the stab-in-the-back 
legend received fertile soil in which to grow. It would flower under 
Adolph Hitler. 
Wells had hoped that a principle of nationalities would develop in 
Europe , ultimately becoming an arrangement of nationalities, a type of 
"United States ," which would lessen interstate rivalries.  He based 
this concept on the Swiss canton system wherein each canton has its own 
rel�gion and culture but is coalesced with the other cantons into a 
federation. 35 Wells hoped that such a canton system would develop in 
Europe because he was distressed by the emphasis being placed by his 
countrymen on the evil of the Germans . Wells had worked for a time in 
Wellington House , the British propaganda ministry , as head of the German 
section. He resigned on July 17,  1918 voicing his dissatisfaction with 
the tone of the propaganda being disseminated. Wells wanted only the 
overthrow of the German militarists; the Propaganda Ministry wanted, at 
least as seen in their propaganda, the extermination of the German 
34H . G .  Wells, What � C�ming? (New ·�fork: The Macmillan Co . ,  1916_), 
pp. 35-36 .  
35rbid . ,  pp. 193-194 .  
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race. 36 To Wells the war was not one against the German race but one 
against the Hohenzollern dynasty. 
Let us not be blinded by the pass ions of war into 
confusing a people with its government and the artif icial 
Kultur of a brief century. There is a Germany , great 
and civilised , a decent and admirable people, masked by 
Imperialism, blinded by the vanity of the easy victories 
of half a century ago , wrapped in illusion. 37 
Wells then became the patriot again. While admitting that Germany 
was hated because of the Hohenzollerns , he stated that economic warfare 
would continue as long as every German identified with the Hohenzollern 
dreams of empire. 38 Thus although the war was being waged by the Hohen-
zollerns it was the average German citizen who had to be killed and de-
feated on the field of battle if the Allies were to be victorious . In 
effect then, Wells was disturbed by the intensity of the race hatred 
spewing forth from Wellington Hous e .  He did realize that some passions 
had to be stirred up if the average Englislunan was to go forth to murder 
his
-
fellow man but his reasonableness and intellect had been assaulted 
by the rabid tone of the propaganda. 
The reasonableness of Wells's arguments became more apparent when 
he discussed the "war crimes" of the Germans . He believed that if a just 
peace were to be achieved acts like the invasion of Belgium and the 
sinking of the Lusitania would have to be put into a special category of 
symptoms of war calling for special punishments or reparations. Above 
all they must not be made a part of the ultimate peace settlement as they 
36George G .  Bruntz, Allied Propaganda and the Collapse � the German 
Empire in 1918 (California: Stanford University Press , 1938), pp. 27-28. 
37well s ,  What � Coming? ,  p .  197 . 
38Ibid . ,  pp.  198-200. 
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would only exacerbate feelings . 39 
Wells , with his scientific background and knowledge of the mech-
anics of modern warfare , realized the terrible potential of mechanized 
warfare as well as the fact that the rules of war were now subject to 
drastic revision. The actions of the submarines helped usher in this 
new age as tl2submarine's effectiveness was limited unless surprise 
could be achieved . Wells knew that war had gone beyond the realm of 
the old rules of cruiser warfare where the ship was stopped and warned 
before being sunk . 
This viewpoint was diametrically the opposite of that held by 
Woodrow Wilson who believed that the nineteenth-century rules of war 
had to be observed . Wells stated that this merely showed the naivete 
of the Americans concerning the war . 
Some /Americans! seemed to be under the impression 
that, war or no war:- an American tourist had a perfect 
right to travel about in the Vosges or up and down the 
Rhine just as he saw fit.  They thought he had just to 
wave a little American flag, and the referee would blow 
a whistle and hold up the battle until he had got by 
safely. 40 
When this is compared to Wilson's statements , especially those concerning 
neutral travel on the high seas as a right, Wells's point is well made. 
Wells ' s  comprehens ion of the horrors of modern warfare made him 
able to understand and view more objectively the actions of Germany . 
This objectivity and understanding disappeared when he wrote as an his-
torian. Throughout his Outline of History.the tone is anti-militaristic . 
39a . G .  Wells , Italy, France and Britain at War (Chicago : M.A.  
Donohue and Co. , 1917), p.  263 . 
40H . G .  Wells , What Is Coming? ,  p .  216. 
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Wells did not like military men and this was reflected by his disparaging 
remarks about them. Seeing Prussia as the most militarized state in 
Europe, Wells's venom reached its highest level. 
Prussianized Germany was at once the newest and the 
most antiquated thing in Western Europe .  She was the 
best and the wickedest state of her time . 41 
The Germans were great because they had come so far in a relatively short 
time . It was the means they used which Wells objected to.  Wells stated 
that no other modern state sinned so greatly against education as did 
Germany . The excesses of patriotic vanity were engendered by the educa-
tional system of Germany . Teachers and professors who did not preach the 
superiority of the Germans were "doomed to failure and obscurity11•4 2  
Thus the educational system had been subverted for nationalistic ends.  
This led to a stifling of the creative imagination in all areas . This 
was most readily apparent in the realm of military science . Wells hit 
this area especially hard because of his hatred of military men in 
general. With all the new weapons and inventions of war, military science 
was far out of date at the onset of the great war . Wells stated that the 
Schlief fen Plan was the best example of the out-of-date tactics employed 
by the Germans . The Schlieffen Plan, designed to knock France out firs t ,  
was based on an extremely strong right flank which would sweep rapidly 
through Belgium and northern France to out-flank the French armies .  This 
plan, which was used in the great war , had been made some twenty years 
before that war occurred . It  completely ignored the political conse-
41H . G .  Wells, The Outline of History: Being� Plain History of Life 
and Mankind (New York: Macmillan and Co . ,  1921), volume II , p .  4 7 9 .  
42wells, Outline o f  History, p .  480. 
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quences which would b e  wrought by the violation of Belgian neutrality 
as well as the limits placed on the speed of the advance by modern ar-
tillery and machine-gun fire. This, to Wells , was what made the war 
even more terrible, the lack of imagination of the military men.43 
When the war came the Schlieff en Plan failed because Graf Helmuth von 
Moltke, Schlieffen ' s  successor, did not keep the right flank strong 
enough to finish the job. 
Regarding the alleged atrocities committed by the Germans in 
Belgium, Wells believed that too great a fuss was being made. He 
s tated that the real atrocity was the invasion itself and that Great 
44 Britain had had to enter the war once that violation was accomplished . 
Over all, Wells did not see the war as being caused by some in-
herently evil monsters called Germans . The war had been visibly appro-
aching in 1913 but there was neither the will nor the understanding to 
prevent i�. Most of the population viewed the war as a new excitement 
to be indulged in. The horror of what the war turned out to be was not 
real to the moods of the time. 45 
Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson was another of the intellectuals who 
wrote on the causes of the war but he did it from the point of view of 
the political scientist. Dickinson traced the war to the Franco-
Prussian rivalry engendered by the war of 1870 and the Anglo-German 
43wells, Outline � History, p .  513. 
44 Ibid . ,  pp. 511-512. 
45Ibid . ,  p .  572. 
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rivalry to Germany' s  desire for a strong navy which challenged Great 
Britain ' s  role as mistress of the seas. 46 These things,  however ,  
merely established the sides for the war; they did not directly cause 
the war .  Dickinson believed that the invasion of Belgium was not even 
the cause of the war but only a consequence of it.  Once Germany was 
committed to war there was really no military alternative for her but 
to go through Belgium to get to France .  Edward Grey had intimated 
that England would defend France regardless.  Thus it made no difference 
to Germany if Belgium were invaded since Great Britain would enter the 
war anyway . What the invasion did do was to strengthen British public 
opinion against Germany , and this did hurt the Germans. Through the 
efforts of Wellington House and its effective use ot propaganda, th� 
war became a glorious crusade against the Hun. 47 It would not seem so 
glorious when those soldiers so imbued with the spirit of the salyation 
. 
of Belgium reached the front. 
Dickinson saw the war as a quest for security with Germany
.
feeling 
the need for a large navy and Great Britain seeing this as a direct 
threat to her power . From this point of view the fever rapidly accel-
erated until full scale war was in progress . Dickinson doubted that 
true peace could be achieved or maintained if the enemy was completely 
crushed. As an example he cited the case of Prussia after Jena and 
its subsequent rise to power.  France too had suffered a humiliating 
def eat at the hands of Prussia in 1871 but had risen again to great 
46Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, War : Its Nature ,  Cause and Cure 
(London: G .  Allen and Unwin, Ltd. , 1923), pp . 58-59. 
47Ibid. , p .  74. 
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power status. 48 The desire for revenge used as a means of pulling a 
country up again was too strong to be taken lightly . Thus Dickinson 
was prophetic to a certain degree. While Germany was not actually 
crushed on the field of battle, the Treaty of Versailles was certainly 
a crushing and humiliating blow. Germany ' s  rise and subsequent revenge 
on the perpetrators of that treaty is only too well known . 
If the espousal of minority viewpoints or unpopular stands in any 
way constitutes intellectuality, Bertrand Russell s tands preeminent 
among thinkers of the twentieth century. His views were such that dur-
ing World War I he was actually considered a dangerous individual by 
his government and was forbidden by government order entry into any 
restricted area. 49 In World War I England ' s  restricted area was any 
territory near the sea, often including whole counties . Perhaps the 
government feared that if Russell got too near the sea he might signal 
the enemy for some treasonable purpose. �e government ' s  harassment 
of Russell became so intense that his passport was revoked . Thus he 
could not even earn a living as he had to forego a position at Harvard 
since he had no passport . This bothered Russell greatly because it 
meant that Britain, his "free" homeland was depriving him of his phy-
sical liberty. 
The beginning of the war instituted in Russell a sort of mental 
rejuvenation causing him to discard his old prejudices and to re-think 
48Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (G. Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd . , 1917) , p .  257 . 
49Bertrand Russell, Justice in War Time (Chicago : Open Court Pub-
lishing Co . ,  1918) , p .  v .  
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certain fundamental questions . He did not believe that Europe was 
insane enough to go to war but he was realistic enough to know that if 
war came England would be involved . so He hoped that England would re-
main neutral but realized that this was impossible when he saw the res-
ponse of the populace to the war. Russell had believed , as did most 
pacifists , that wars were forced on unwilling populations by Machia­
vellian governments. 51 The overwhelmingly j oyful response of the 
average person to the coming of the war caused Russell to re-think his 
position. He came to view the statesmen as the true harbingers of the 
war as they were the ones who made the decisions which sent young men 
to their slaughter . The fact that the young men Qid not see� to .D}ind 
going to war meant that the statesmen merely· loosed popular iorces held 
within the population. This ,  however , did not mitigate Russell ' s  ire 
toward the s tatesmen. Even though a paci.fist Russ.ell wrote: "Fo� 
several weeks I felt that if r should happen to �eet Asquith. or Gre¥ t 
should be unable to refrain from murder . 1152 Russell ' s  low opinion of 
the statesmen of the time was not confined only to t�e British variety. 
He expressed indignation over the fact tha.t no statesman was thinking of 
the good of all. 
Is there no statesman who can think in terms of 
Europe, not only of separate nations? Is our own civi­
lisation a thing of no account to all our rulers? 53 
50Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co. , 1969} , vol. I I ,  p .  3 .  
51Ibid . ,  pp . 3-4 . 
52Ibid. , p .  7 .  
53Russell, Justice in War Time , p .  117.  
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Although he was disturbed by the fact that Great Britain would go to 
war , Russell was tortured by his own patriotism . As a pacifist he ab-
horred war but his love of country made him desire the def eat of Ger-
many . However, he did protest the propaganda of Great Britain as it 
sickened him as much as the slaughter did. 
As a lover of truth, the national propaganda of all 
the belligerent nations sickened me . As a lover of 
civilization, the relent to barbarism appalled me. 54 
Other protests took other forms . One of these was an open letter 
to President Wilson written in 1915 which depicted Russell's belief 
that European civilization was in danger of complete and utter des-
truction unless the president would negotiate the end of the war . 
Russell pointed out that he had no office which would have lent author-
ity to his plea but could only write as one concerned with reason and 
mercy. SS 
The theme of the war threatening to put an end to civilization 
appeared again in Russell's writings . He believed that civilization 
would be threatened when war became corranon-place thus making men callous 
to its effects. 56 He believed that most men saw the horror of war and 
realized the evil it caused but that excessive nationalism and chauvin-
ism caused men to lose their perspective when viewing war. 
War is felt to be the ultimate test of :a nation ' s  
manhood, the ultimate proof of its vigour and of its 
54Russell, Autobiography, p .  7 .  
55 Ibid . ,  pp . 22-26 . 
56Russell , Justice in War Time , p .  107 . 
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right to exis t . 57 
The problem was that men viewed war as evil when other nations were in-
volved in it . Then it was possible to look at the refugees , the dead, 
the wounded , and the maimed as casualties of some useless adventure.  
However , when one ' s  own nation was involved , war became a necessity, 
albeit an evil necessity, but a necessity all the same to prove to the 
world that that country was strong and vital. Survival of the fittest 
became the key to the situation and the evils and inhumanity of war were 
pushed aside. 
On August 12,  1914, Russell wrote a letter to the Londo n Nation 
which was published on 15 August. The letter protested Great Britain's  
share in  the destruction of  Germany. Russell stated that certain 
things should always remain constant; for example , if an Englishman had 
killed a German one month before, he would be hanged as a murderer. 
Now, if that Englishman killed a Gennan, he would be seen as a patriot 
and would be decorated as a hero . The blame for this unwholesome state 
of affairs lay with the statesmen,  especially the British statesmen,  
who were bent on war regardless of Germany ' s  actions . Russell was re-
£erring specifically to Edward Grey ' s  reply to the German ambassador 
stating that he could not say that Great Britain would remain neutral if 
Belgium were not violated . No statements on conditions for neutrality 
could be elicited from Grey. As a result Russell could only say: 
I cannot resist the conclusion that the Government 
has failed in its duty to the nation by not revealing 
long-standing arrangements with the French, until, at 
57Russell , Justice in War Time , p .  61. 
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the last moment , it made them the basis of an appeal 
to honor ; that it has failed in its duty to Europe by 
not declaring its attitude at the beginning of the crisis·; 
and that it has failed in its duty to humanity by not in­
forming Germany of conditions which would insure its non­
participation in a war which, whatever its outcome, must 
cause untold hardship and the loss of many thousands of 
our bravest and noblest citizens . SB 
Russell ' s  protests took other forms as well. The most visual was 
his six month imprisomnent for writing an article for The Tribunal , a 
paper published by the No Conscription Fellowship . In the article 
Russell stated that American soldiers would be used as strike breakers 
in England to avert a labor crisis. This statement was the last straw 
for the British government and so Russell was packed off to prison. He 
did not find prison life horrifying , rather he said it was quite 
agreeable. He was allowed to read, do some writing, and was able to 
smuggle out certain other letters and pamphlets in some rather ingen­
ious ways . 59 Actually Russell ' s  imprisonment merely served to increase 
his stature among opponents of the war as it showed the British govern-
ment in its most spiteful state. 
As stated earlier Russell was concerned because England , his "free" 
country, had seen fit to deprive him of his livelihood and his freedom. 
It was the injustice of the government that really bothered him, not 
only "the government ' s  injustice toward him but also that inj ustice meted 
out to other people. The government ' s  injustice toward the masses was 
demonstrated by the fact that it chose to participate in the war . War 
itself was the greatest of all evils. Russell s tated that "sympathy 
58Russell , Autobiography, pp . 42-25 . 
59rbid. , p .  30.  
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with Belgium should make us hate war rather than Germany". 60 On a 
less esoteric level war visited more specific evils on humanity. 
The first, and one of the worst, evils was the factthat a large 
number of young men, the most fit,  were killed , maimed , or driven mad . 
Here was the beginning of the "lost generation" theme so prevalent in 
the 1920 ' s .  The cream o f  European youth was destroyed and for what? 
The tragedies inflicted on non-combatants were the second great 
evil brought about by the war . World War I was the first war which 
really dislocated the lives of non-combatants,  socially, economically, 
culturally, and far too often physically. 
Another evil caused by the war was the slowing of economic pro­
gress.  As economic progress was slowed so was social progress. To 
the middle class person economic progress was a foregone conclusion but 
at the lower levels of the social and economic strata it was not. With­
out a certain amount of economic progress at these levels , social and 
spiritual progress was impossible . The question became one of how could 
people be expected to develop if they were unable to prosper economi­
cally? This was Russell ' s  lead-in to a discussion of socialism which he 
believed was the sanest force in Eruope because of its internationalism 
and ability _ to pr�serve a certain degree of humanity. Russell did not 
mention the fact that the various socialist parties killed international­
ism by voting war credits to their respective governments thus getting 
caught up in the tide of public opinion which heralded the beginning of 
the war . 
60 Russell, Justice in War Time , p .  24. 
37 
The worst tragedy engendered by the war was the hatred and injus-
tice it caused . Russell believed that the war was due to blindness to 
the comity of mankind . It was not a physical necessity which caused 
men to fight but their own stupidity and chauvinism. Russell thus 
viewed human nature as basically good but somewhat lacking when it 
came to acting in its own best interests. 61 
Russell did not confine his views only to the rather philosophical 
topics already mentioned . On a more specific level , he did not believe 
that any of the combatants were justified in the war since, in his opin­
ion, war was a crime under all circumstances. 62 All the talk about 
Great Britain 's coming to the defense of neutral Belgium was just so 
much pap for public opinion. Belgium was not the determining factor 
for Britain 's entry into the war but the threat to France was . Russell 
agreed that the German invasion of Belgium mustered British public 
opinion because: 
Belgium showed Germany at its worst , but it did not 
show us at our best. It gave Germany an occasion for 
brutal violence � it gave our Foreign Office an occasion 
for hypocrisy. 6.J 
The fact that Belgium was not the major factor in the decision for war 
can be seen through a study of history. In 1887 there was tension bet-
ween France and Germany . War was expected and the likelihood of Germans 
marching through Belgium was admitted. The British newspapers, as re-
flectors of public opinion, concluded that the obligation to Belgium 
61Russell, Justice in War Time, pp.  23-26 . 
62Ibid . ,  p .  1 9 .  
63Ibid . , p .  124. 
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did not require going to war . In 1914 the British obligation to Bel-
gium was stated as resting entirely on the 1839 Treaty of London which 
had guaranteed Belgian neutrality. If Belgium were so important, why 
was England ready to enter a conflict in 1914 but not in 1887? Russell 
viewed it simply as a . change in the British view of British interests. 64 
What happened was that the Anglo-German rivalry came to a head in 
1914. Prior to this Great Britain had acted with hostility toward Ger­
many in the Morocco crisis. 65 In fact , it can be. said that the policy 
of the Entente encouraged the warlike elements in Germany by showing 
that the Entente was ready for war . 66 The crises were averted only at 
the last moment but the underlying tension and hostility was still pre-
sent. 1914 simply brought it into the open. 
64Russell, Justice in War Time , p .  124. 
65Ibid . ,  p .  193. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Peace Conference and Treatment of Germany 
What happened at Versailles was very different from what the in-
tellectuals believed necessary to achieve a just peace. We will see 
what suggestions were given by the intellectuals as they voiced their 
hopes for the future of Europe and the world . Next we will see the 
peace as it actually turned out as well as the opinions in favor of 
and against the treaty. Lastly we will study the reparations ques-
tion as it clearly affected Germany more than anything else in the 
treaty . 
George Bernard Shaw ' s  views , especially those expressed in his 
"Peace Conference Hint s , "  shows best the intellectual ' s  s tand on the 
peace . He believed that the map of Europe had to be redrawn to make 
sure that war could not easily occur again. This redrawing would not 
be done by some omnipotent and omniscient Inquiry but would occur as 
a result of plebiscites to determine the will of the people involved . 67 
Another way in which the peace could be re-established and main-
tained was to establish a hegemony of peace involving Germany , France ,  
and Great Britain. This hegemony would make a repeat of 1914 impossible 
as Germany and France would be allied . World War I occurred when 
Germany and France became involved in a Russian-Aus trian dispute. 68 
67George Bernard Shaw. What .!_ Really 
Brentano ' s ,  1931) , pp.  65-66. 
68tbid . ,  pp . 68-69 . 
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Wrote About the War (New York: 
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Shaw was not so much a believer in the balance of power concept to 
maintain peace as he was a supporter of ideology as the basis for 
the post-wa� world . He believed that it was absurd that England should 
have joined Russia in destroying Germany when the Russian Tsarist 
government was the enemy of every English liberty. 69 Germany was 
closer to England in ideology than Russia was and so Germany must be 
saved . Shaw ' s  position was not unlike Winston Churchill ' s  after World 
War II as both believed Germany must remain strong as a buffer against 
Russia . To this end , Shaw stated the Great Britain's desire for re-
venge against Germany should be reconsidered . The blockade alone had 
caused 763,000 Germans to die of starvation for no other reason than 
revenge . 70 This was not the way to achieve peace and stability. The 
militarists, however, wanted Germany ''bled white" and the blockade was 
a good way of doing this . Shaw had a suggestion for his countrymen 
who felt this way . Rather than sinking Germany ' s  fleet or annexing 
her colonies it would be better to take care of her numbers. The sol-
dier it took seconds to kill, it  took nine months of travail for a 
woman to breed and eighteen years to ripen. Thus to insure that Germany 
could never field an army again, simply kill seventy-five percent of all 
. 71 G�rman women under sixty years of age. This very effectively showed 
how Shaw viewed the continued blockade of Germany . He believed that 
militarism must not be seen as a peculiarly Prussian institution. It 
69George Bernard Shaw. What .!. Really Wrote About the War (New York: 
Brentano ' s ,  1931) , p .  7 0 .  
70ibid . ,  pp . 308-309. 
71Ibid . ,  p .  63.  
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must be admitted that Great Britain's conduct of the war was no better 
than Germany ' s . 72 
Shaw delineated some very specific points concerning what should 
be accepted before any of the parties even sat down at Versailles. 
{l) All parties should enter Paris on equal terms morally re-
garding the planning and preparation for the war since self-
preservation was the basis for all actions . 
(2) Since a naval blockade decided the war , it must be admitted 
that Great Britain has a power no other country has--the power 
of starvation. 
{3) The United States feels that she must have a fleet capable 
of coping with any existing armament unless the League can change 
the armament situation. 
(4) Since Germany's desire for a strong fleet led to World War 
I ,  the US. need for a fleet is the first step toward the next war 
unless the League becomes a reality . 
(5) The League must be a combination of states with settled 
responsible governments of the democratic type.  
(6)  Governments of the North American republic type should be 
eligible for League membership without question. Monarchies must 
satisfy the League that they are responsible. 
(7 ) Germany cannot be admitted until her government is settled 
but peace cannot be insured unless Germany is admitted . 
(8) The campaign of hatred against Germany must be ended . 
72George Bernard Shaw. What ! Really Wrote About the War (New York: 
Brentano's, 1931) , p .  95. 
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(9) Disarmament is possible but delusive . The League must 
balance and morally control arms. Making war physically im-
possible cannot be done . 
(10) There should be no neutrality as it is impossible to main-
tain. 
(11) Wilson by intellectual and moral superiority must make certain 
his views predominate .  He must awaken America to the gravity of the 
world wituation. 73 
Shaw was not the only intellectual to be concerned with the fate of 
the world after the war . Austin Harrison edited The English Review and 
wrote articles in such journals as Nineteenth Century, Contemporary, 
National Review, Fortnightly, and North American Review • .  Born March 27 , 
1873, �rrison was educated at the Universities of Lausanne , Marburg, 
and Berlin. Besides articles, he authored several books The Pan-
Germanic Doctrine, England and Germany, and The Kaiser's War. 
Harrison wrote in the English Review an article entitled "Covenant 
or Tilsit?" in which he stated that the powers meeting in Paris had a 
decision to make regarding what the peace would b e .  He pointed out that 
as a result of the conference the League of Nations would become the 
gi;eatest world power because it would control the "hunger-points" of 
Europe . It just so happened that these "hunge-r-points" were also the 
points of honour of the belligerent nations . Thus we would still have 
the German-Polish rivalry at Danzig , Italian-Jugo-Slav rivalry at 
Fiume , Turk versus Russian at Constantinople, and German versus French-
73George Bernard Shaw. What I Really Wrote About the War (New York: 
Brentano's, 1931) , pp . 304-30S:
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man in the Saar. 74 Food is the key to the League ' s  power as the League 
deprives the defeated powers of the economic resources necessary for 
recovery. The League then becomes the punisher of the defeated powers , 
thus taking over the role of the victorious powers. This is why the 
League was brought into being according to Harrison. No true princi-
ples caused the Covenant to evolve and it will not solve the problems 
which caused the war. 
The root points of war--colour, religion, economics, 
nationality--remain untouched. They will remain un­
solved. 75 
In another article entitled "Peace or War?" Harrison pointed out 
the difficulty involved in achieving a certain degree of fairness at 
Versailles. A subtle criticism of Wilson's  idealism was �he point 
here. 
We dare not, for instance , fight for nationality 
and · at the same time debar the Germans from claiming 
nationality. 76 
The problems lay. in the fact that Wilson believed that wars could 
be halted in Europe once all nationalities were allowed to join their 
homelands. He did not take into account the fact that Great Britain 
and France desired the punishment of Germany . Thus self determination 
was denied the Germans. In 1936 Hitler was very careful to state that 
he was merely following the principles of self determination in annexing 
Austria. Simply stated , Wilson ' s  idealistic pronouncements on self 
74Austin Harrison , "Covenant or Tilsit?" English Review, XXVIII. 
(Jan.-June 1919), 540 . 
75Ibid . ,  pp . 541-542. 
7 6rbid. , p .  7 5 .  
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determination were used to start ·World War II . 
When discussing what the peace turned out to b e  one must be aware 
of the personalities involved at the peace conference.  The British 
intellectuals were well aware of the differences in personalities of 
the characters at Ver·sailles as well as the problems those differences 
would cause .  
H . G .  Wells stated that the problems o f  the conference began with 
the election of Clemenceau as its president . As a professional pat-
riot, Clemenceau sounded a note of revenge when the true business of 
. 7 7  the conference should have been the future o f  mankind. When such a 
man as this came up against a man like Woodrow Wilson, the result had 
to be the breaking of one of them; According to Shaw, Wilson came to 
Europe to stand for Republicanism. This was his mission. 78 The pro-
blem was that when he got to Paris, he went war mad and began to talk 
of war guilt like any j ingo . The strain of peace had finally broken 
him. 79 
All of this occurred because of fundamental errors which Wilson 
fell prey to . Wells describes them in his Outline .£1 History. The ma-
jor error was Wilson ' s  own conduct of the war and negotiation of the 
peace. He made the whole affair a personal vendetta: the peace became 
Wilson's peace, even in his own mind. Wells believed that Wilson should 
not even have come to Paris. By doing so , he became overly involved in 
77a . G .  Wells.  The Outline of History: Being �  Plain History of 
Life and Mankind (�ew York: Macmillan Co . ,  1921), p .  555 . 
78shaw, What ...!. Really \.lrote About the War, p .  281. 
79Ibid . ,  p. 314 . 
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the proceedings when he could have stayed home and more strongly exer-
. 80 cised the force of moral principle. 
Wells stated that Wilson compounded the blunder of coming to 
Paris because he was not expert in the intricacies of European power 
politics. Wilson ' s  list of books showed a mind directed exclusively 
to American history and politics. 
He was mentally the new thing in history, negligent 
of and rather ignorant of 
8f
he older things out of which 
his new world had arisen. 
Besides not understanding European politics ve+y well , Wilson's 
over-all naivete rather limited his effectiveness.  At Paris he was 
dealing with hardened realistic politicians who often grew tired of 
Wilson' s  idealistic attitude. Clemenceau expressed his disdain for 
Wilson by saying that the President "talked like Jesus Christ" and that 
with his Fourteen Points Wilson was "worse" than God, "Le bon Dieu only 
had ten. iiSZ 
Although Wells �elieved that there were great differences between 
Clemenceau and Wilson, Shaw stated that the differences were not so 
great. A debate in the French chamber which began on 27 December showed 
this. 
li.ilson--1£ the future had nothing for us hut a new 
attempt to keep the world at right poise by a balance 
of power, the United States would take no interest, 
because she will join no combination of power which is 
not a combination of all of us . 83 
80walls, The Outline � History, pp . 550-551 .  
81Ibid . ,  P P •  543-544.  
82rbid . ,  p .  556. 
83shaw, What ..!.. Really Wrote About the War , p .  292. 
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Clem��c@a� �tated for his side: 
There i$ an old sy�tem, the balance of power , to 
whi�h l remain faithful. This system seems to be now 
�ondemneg ; �ut if such a balance of power had preceded 
the wa� , and if Britain, America, France, and Italy 
hid @�reed to say that whoever attacked one of them 
W@Yld pe �ttacking the whole world, this atrocious war 
wo�ld not have taken place. This system of alliance 
@hell pe my guiding thought at the Conference. I 
'h�ll m�ke all possible sacrifices to this end. 84 
i@§eRti�lly Wilson and Clemenceau were in agreement, at least as 
to the e�d@ if �Qt in means . Both men �anted peace but each had a dif-
feient way o! maintaining it--Wilson through the League of Nations and 
Clemence�u thfough the balance of power against Germany . Wilson' s  con-
ee�tie� of the tea�ue as a force to be reckoned with by any nation con-
templetini w�r w�s the same idea Clemenceau held when he stated that 
any att3�� WQqlg �e construed as an attack upon the whole world. The 
f@@�lt i� b�th e0�ei would be the same. 
Jo�tn3li�ti� Qpinion of the treaty of peace was mixed in its re-
3�tiQfi tQ the te:rm$ • . Austin Harrison, an opponent of revanche as we 
ft3Ve elfe�dy �een, wrote that : 
The conditions of peace which are to be dictated 
to Ge�e�Y have never been equalled in history. In 
the�r meticulous laceration, their continuous string-
. ency , the�r throttle-hold on the vitals of a nation, 
they ��e without a precedent ; and if there is a certainty, 
it i$ th�t the 'Wilson' peace, once so feared by extre­
m��ts, will go down to posterity as the most comprehensive 
do�qment Q f  punishment on record. as 
�rri�on doubted that the treaty with its harsh treatment of Germany 
W'!S the be$t way of making the world "safe for democracy" as was origin-
84Shaw, �at !. Really Wrote About the War, p .  292. 
S�H�rr:i,son, "Covenant or Tilsit? " ,  p .  531. 
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ally intended. 86 All the talk of new. de-qiocracies. and aelf determina-
tion was put aside when it came to Germany . Thus the idealism of 
Wilson ' s  Fourteen Points was used only when the Allies, most especially 
France, saw fit and not applied in the same manner to Germany . 
While most of the intellectuals were concerned with certain 
general matters , John Maynard Keynes concerned himself with the very spe-
cific problem of reparations as it applied at Versailles . Keynes was an 
extremely interesting character. A man of urbanity and wit , he criti-
cized the important figures assembled at Versailles . Some examples 
of Keynes 's opinions on general topics will suffice to show his 
style. Of the "negotiating" of the Versailles Treaty he said "there 
are few episodes in history which posterity will have less reason to 
condone. 1187 Concerning the British "Khaki" election of December 
1918 Keynes stated: "a vote for a Coalition candidate meant the Cru-
cif ixion of the Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British 
National Debt . 1188 His views on President Wilson are well enough known 
that they do not bear repeating here, but Keynes ' s  opinion of the treaty 
generally and the League of Nations in P?rticular is extremely interest-
ing. He viewed President Wilson and General Smuts as firm believers in 
t�e League as a force to be involved in the revision of the treaty. 
Keynes believed that Articles V and X (the unanimity and collective se-
86Austin Harrison, "The Throttle-hold", English Review , XXVIII.. 
(Jan. -June 1919) , 539.  
87John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New 
York : Harcourt ,  Brace, and Howe , 1920) , p .  145 .  
88Keynes , Economic Consequences, p. 144. 
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curity clauses) made the League an instrument for the preservation of 
89 the status quo rather than an instrument for progres s .  In this view 
Keynes was siding with such men as Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and 
Walter Lippmann, the editors of The New Renublic, who felt that the 
League of Nations would only make a bad situation worse. Generally 
the supporters of the League believed that it would operate by the in-
fluence of public opinion throughout the world. Keynes hoped that 
this would be the case but he felt that trained European diplomats 
would use the League to obstruct and delay necessary change and pro­
gress . 9 0  
Keynes was temporarily attached t o  the British Treasury during the 
war and was the official representative of that department at the Paris 
Peace Conference until June 7 ,  1919 . He resigned when he b ecame aware 
of the fact that the treaty was incapable of being modified. Keynes 
believed that the attempt to force Germany to pay general war costs was 
politically unwise and could only lead to disaster in the economic 
realm. This would occur because the basic problems of Europe were 
economic, not political or social. The difficulties were enhanced be-
cause neither Wilson nor Lloyd George were aware of the economic ramif i-
f h d 1 . 9 1  cations o t eir propose s o  utions . Keynes believed that resignation 
was the only way he could make his views apparent . In the cabinet sys-
tem of Great Britain this was a wise and logical step which had its in-
tended effect of alerting the public to what was occurring at Versailles . 
89Keynes, Economic Consequences , pp . 257-260. 
9°Keynes , Economic Consequences , p .  259 . 
9 1 Ibid . ,  p .  146 . 
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Keynes ' s  o'W'n estimate of a reasonable reparations payment would 
have set a sum of 10 ,000,000,000 dollars which Germany would have to 
pay. His estimate of what the Allies and Associated powers were de-
manding as reparations from Germany ran as follows : 
British Empire $ 7 , 000,000,000 
France 12,000,000,000 
Italy 2 , 500 , 000,000 
Others (including U . S . )  3 ,500 , 000,000
92 Total $ 25 , 000,000 , 000 
Keynes believed that the treaty contained nothing concerning the 
economic rehabilitation of Europe. Thus he could do nothing but view 
the future pessimistically. 93 He blamed the representatives of the 
United States for this draw-back as they had no concrete proposals to 
alleviate the sufferings of Europe. 94 The best way to alleviate the 
sufferings of Europe, Keynes felt , was by a cancellation of war debts 
by the United States. The only problem was that this was an unthinkable 
idea for most Americans . Keynes believed , however , that even an abate­
ment of part of the debt would have helped greatly . 95 
The economic problems could have been solved before the conference 
if the United States and Great Britain could have agreed upo� the follow-
ing points : 
(1) cancellation of all inter-Allied debt s .  
(2) a set sum of 1 0  billiqn dollars for reparations . 
(3) renunciation of reparations by Great Britain. 
92Keynes ,  Economic Consequences , p .  160. 
93Ibid . ,  p .  226. 
94Ibid . ,  p .  150. 
95Ray Stannard Baker,  Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement . 
(Gloucester , Mas s . : P .  Smith, 1922) . 
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(4) an agreement as to the appropriate proportion of 
reparations to be guaranteed to all other parties 
of the treaty . 
(5) the issuance of bonds by Germany to cover the 
amount of reparations . 96 
Since these questions were not dealt with prior to the conference, Keynes 
had a solution after the conference was over. Several of the points are 
the same but many are new to deal with the exigencies which had arisen: 
(1) reparations and costs should be set at 10 billion 
dollars . 
(2) the surrender of merchant ships , submarine cables , 
war material, and claims against territory should 
be set at 2 . 5  billion dollar s .  
(3) the balance of 7 . 5  billion dollars should b e  set 
with no interest pending repayment .  It should then 
be paid in thirty installments of 250 million be­
ginning in 1923. 
(4) the Reparations Commission should be dissolved or 
brought under the control of the League of Nations . 
It should also include representatives from Germany 
as well as neutral countries . 
(5) Germany should meet the annual payments as she sees 
fit. Complaints should be lodged with the League . 
(6) no reparations should be demanded from Austria. 97 
It is interesting to note just exactly what some of these provisions im-
ply. For example, suggestion number five is essentially the same thing 
as the Young Plan which would come into being se�eral years later. Num-
ber five also forbids any unilateral action against Germany such as the 
French took in 1923 when they occupied the Ruhr. Thus we can see that 
while Keynes viewed the League as a moralistic device, he did believe 
96Keynes, Economic Consequences, pp . 147-148. 
97Ibid . ,  pp . 261-262. 
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that it could act as a strong force in international politic s .  
Essentially Keynes was a f iI'lll believer in the idea that the f inan-
cial problems of Europe could be solved only by magnanimity and not be 
greed . 98 Probably the best testament to the significance of John May-
nard Keynes comes from Seth Tillman who wrote on Anglo-American rela-
tions at Versailles : 
Had John Maynard Keynes been a member o� the 
Reparations Commission, it is quite possible that 
Sumner and Cunliffe would have had to pay close atten­
tion to his views as a representative of the British 
Treasury. Keynes ' s  own analysis of the German capacity 
to pay led him to the conclusion that an overall re­
parations sum of $40 billion, or even $25 billion, was not 
within the limits of reasonable possibility. When the 
issue of the fixed sum was taken up by the Supreme Coun­
cil , however , it was the views of Sumner and Cunliffe, 
and not of Keynes ,  which influenced Lloyd George, bring­
ing him into direct collision with President Wilson. 99 
It is most interesting to note that the representatives on the Repara-
tions Commission for the British Empire were Hughes , Cunliffe, and Sum-
ner--three who were in favor of demanding huge sums from Germany . In-
deed how different things might have been if Keynes had been there. 
In the two decades following the end of the war the problems wrought 
by the reparations issue came to a head . In this period John Maynard 
Keynes was proved correct in his views of what would happen if the eco-
nomic difficulties were not solved at Versailles . It cannot be said 
that the reparations issue caused the rise of Hitler but a good case can 
be made to show how reparations affected his rise indirectly. In 1923 a 
grave economic crisis hit Germany . Inflation was rampant . At one point 
98Keynes ,  Economic Consequences,  pp . 147-148 . 
99seth P .  Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919.  (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press , 
1961) . 
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the rate of exchange reached one trillion marks to the dollar . Repara­
tions certainly did not help avoid this crisis. 
With such horrible inflation, many men were put out of work. 
These were the men from which Hitler recruited his forces. Dissatisfac­
tion with reparations , war guilt, and Germany ' s  new government fueled 
the fire which forged Hitler ' s  tyrannical state. 
The loans from the United States did not help matters much as they 
were used to meet the reparations demands of the Allies. It almost 
seemed as if the United States was trying to make up for her oversights 
at Versailles,  but it was too late. Even though the reparations demands 
were later liberalized by the Dawes and Young Plans , when the great 
crash came it struck Germany especially hard . Hitler was just around 
the corner. It is important to note that reparations had been virtually 
done away with by the time of the crash and depression. However, even 
though this was the cas e ,  the economic difficulties inherent in the re­
parations problem remained. The damage had already been done and it 
could not be reversed. 
A relatively minor point but one which received some attention from 
the intellectuals was the six month continuation of the blockade of Ger­
many after the armistice of 11 November and its attendant effect upon 
the mood of the country . In reality the blockade was not that bad. It 
did cause inconvenience and hard feelings among the Germans but the 
claims of mass starvation were exaggerated. The intellectuals , however ,  
seized on the blockade as proof o f  man ' s  inhumanity t o  man. Austin 
Harrison disliked the blockade because it was unfair and arbitrary. He 
believed that it would be removed only when the people let th� politi-
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cians know that they will not allow the enemy to be starved in the 
name of the League . Harrison saw the blockade as a reflection of the 
anti-German feeling enthroned in Paris. 
The thing of Paris is not gentlemanly . It enslaves 
our enemies and degrades the victors .  And it creates 
continy8us conditions of war . Thus Armageddon ends in 
farce. O 
George Bernard Shaw also took up the case against the continued 
blockade. He compared Great Britain ' s  use of the blockade to Napoleon ' s  
turning of his cannon on the ice when he caught the Russians on a frozen 
lake. When the shooting stopped he then tried to save the drowning 
Russian soldiers . With characteristic overstatement Shaw then asked why 
we were starving the children of Germany . "Are we out , not merely for 
defeat , but for extermination?"lOl He then went further,  stating that 
the reparations could not be paid if the German industry was ruined and 
the workers starved. Even slaves must be fed as well as beaten. 102 
Henry Noel Brailsford approached the whole punishment issue from 
another angle. He travelled in Germany after the war and wrote concern-
ing the mood of the people there . He stated that there was a great deal 
of self-guilt and hopelessness about the situation. Even the German papers 
condemned such acts as the violation of Belgium, the devastation of the 
Somme, and the U-boat war. 103 In short , the Germans were sorry for their 
lOOHarrison, "Covenant or Tilsit?" , p .  557.  
lOlG�orge Bernard Shaw . Prefaces £l. Bernard Shaw (Long Acre, London: 
Odhams Press, Ltd . ,  1938) , p .  495.  
102 4 Ibid . , p .  96.  
103Henry Noel Brailsford . Across the Blockade (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Howe , 1919) , pp. 115-116 . 
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sins and were ready to admit to some degree of guilt . However, this 
woeful mood passed with the publication of the Treaty. The Germans 
saw the terms as the Allies'  project for the destruction of their in­
dustry in order to be rid of a commercial riva1 . 104 Thus the indemnity 
and loss of foreign trade would ruin Germany . Germans would be forced 
to emigrate because they would be unable to buy food from abroad. The 
problem would then become one of where could the Germans go . 
Mr. Hoover has predicted that ten or twelve million 
Germans will be forced to emigrate. Whither? North 
America is closed. The Argentine is legally open, and 
Russia one day will be open. But shall we tolerate a 
German 'penetration' of Russia? Will the ghost of 
President Monroe allow Latin-America to be Germanized? 105 
�his united the country under the banner of resistance to the terms . The 
rise of men like Adolph Hitler can be seen as a reflection of this resis-
tance and a logical outgrowth of it.  
In �ummary , what occurred at Versailles was not what Woodrow Wilson 
or ·the intellectuals of Great Britain had in mind. Instead of a just 
peace, what occurred was revenge and a continuation of the conditions of 
war . 
104Henry Noel Brailsford. Across the Blockade (New York: Harcourt , 
Brace and Howe, 1919), pp . 118-119 . 
l05Ibid . ,  pp. 124-125.  
CHAPTER FOUR 
The League of Nations 
The League of Nations came into being as the major hope for main-
taining peace in a troubled world. The intellectuals of Great Britain 
were essentially men of hope and vision but their disagreements con-
cerning the League are most interesting. While all agreed as to its 
necessity , they were involved in the important questions of what the 
League should do and by what means these things should be done. 
The League was viewed as necessary as a means of achieving stability 
and security. Brailsford pointed out that there were two concepts of 
security which were within the realm of possibility . The first was se-
curity imposed by a force which had the ability to make the world sub-
mit to its will. The second , and more pleasant concept , involved a 
world which had purged itself of its worst elements to achieve security. 
106 This second concept Brailsford believed was in the offing. 
Theoretically , the only security seems to lie in some 
organic international association, which, by the creation 
of intimate and pervasive relationships of interdependence 
within itsel f ,  is at least in process of evolution towards 
'the ideal of international solidarity . 107 
In its initial formation the League must face two tests if it is to 
106a.N.  Brailsford, A League of Nations (New York: The Macmillan Co . ,  
1917) , p .  324 . 
l07R.N.  Brailsford, The Covenant of Peace: An Essay � the League of 
Nations (New York: B .W:--liuebsch , 1919) , p . · 8 . 
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survive . First, the League ' s  composition must be such that all memb�rs 
are assured the prospect of the fair settlement of disputes , thus mak­
ing war unn�cessary. Second, if the worst does occur and war breaks 
out, the League must be strong enough to gain superiority over the 
warring powers. If the League is unable to achieve superiority, it is 
doomed to failure . 108 
This second point was Brailsford ' s  most telling one. He saw that 
the coalitions and alliances had become very strong and that their con­
tinuation meant that every war would be a universal one. Thus it would 
be the task of the League to break up the alliance systems . 109 This 
was the reason for the necessity of the League , according to Brailsford. 
The intellectual concerned mainly with arguments for the necessity 
of the League was H.G.  Wells . Re believed that the League was necessary 
because war had become so destructive . The choice was between an organi­
zation of permanent peace or the progressive development of war and the 
ultimate destruction of civilization. 110 
Wells based his beliefs on the assumption that war by its very 
nature is illimitable .  Since war is a cessation of law and order it 
would be impossible to prevent the use of all means of killing . Wells 
saw that many people would not accept the fact that war could not be 
limited , preferring to believe that a code of conduct or type of chivalry 
could be used to impose restrictions on the making of war . Wells count­
ered this by stating that it would be easier to abolish war than to res-
108Brailsford, A League of Nations , p .  47 .  
l09Brailsford , The Covenant of Peace, pp . 11-12. 
llOH.G.  Wells , The Idea EE_ a League of Nations (Boston, 1919) , p .  8 .  
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trict it because a nation could very easily be swept along if the en�my 
were not bound by the same self-imposed restrictions . 111 This very ex-
ample occur�ed during the war with the problems engendered by Germany ' s  
invasion o f  Belgium as well as the continued use of the submarine. Ger-
many viewed the invasion of Belgium as a necessity in the same way she 
viewed continued unrestricted submarine warfare. The Allies saw these 
same German necessities as atrocities. The point was who was to be the 
referee to determine what would be legal and what would not when the world 
was at war .  More importantly, would the referee be strong enough to in-
sure that his decisions would be upheld? 
Wells went even further to prove his point concerning the illimi-
tability of war by stating the case of the Argive-Lacedaemonian s truggle 
at Thyrea mentioned in Herodotus . Here the strug�le was to be determined 
by a test of champions . The terms were that 300 �rom each. side would 
battle to deteniP.ne the vi.ctor. The armies were sent home so that they· 
could not help if their side got into trouble. The two sides were so 
evenly matched that by the end of the day only three men were left, two 
Argives and one Spartan. The two Argives,  regarding themselves as vie-
tors, went home . The Spartan stayed behind to strip the Argive dead be-
fore ' going home. When the armies learned of the result both claimed vie-
tory, the Argives because they had more survivors , the Spartans because 
they had stayed on the field to strip the dead while the enemy ran away . 
The battle which both sides had sought to avoid was then fought anyway . 112 
111n.G.  Wells , The Idea of !. League of Natiqns (Boston, 1919 ) , pp . 16-18 . 
112 Ibid . ,  P P •  22-23 . 
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Thus even the concept of limitation of war had its difficulties when it 
actually came to putting the plan into operation. Again, who was to 
referee in order to determine the victor when the victory is not clear-
cut? Wells believed that it was possible for nations to agree not to 
resort to force when they have suffered injustices, either real or ima-
gined, It was quite against human nature that , having appealed to force, 
those nations should limit its use and accept defeat rather than cross 
the stipulated boundaries. 113 
Having stated reasons for the League ' s  necessity , Wells recognized 
that there were certain obj ections which could be raised against the 
League. First there was the biological objection which states that the 
end of war is impossible because all life is conflict. Man expands and 
increases his control by conflict and the fittest survive. Wells point-
ed out that life as conflict was a misconception when applied to war be-
cause war was not discriminatory. The fittest do not survive. Admit-
tedly this was not the case when wars were fought with spears as the 
strongest did survive . Even with the advent of firearms , alertness,  
alacrity, and wit could keep a man alive . But the new modes of warfare 
rained down death in an entirely haphazard manner. Modern war involving 
millions of men killed those men in a haphazard manner . No amount of 
strength helped a man in those circumstances . In fact , the shirkers and 
114 the parasitical members of the society profited. Survival of the 
fittest meant that the society would continue to prosper and grow. With 
ll3H.G.  Wells , The Idea of .!. League of Nations (Boston, 1919) , pp . 24-25. 
114Ibid . ,  pp . 28-29 . 
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the lei� fit 1urviving the iociety could only decline . 
Another o�jection to th� League which Well� foresaw and replied to 
wa1 tho argument that the meehonical and chemical advances brought about 
at a re1ult of the war were sood and neeeswary if the world i1 to advance. 
Well1 admitted that the advances were necessary but that the cost was out 
of proportion to the overall gain . The best men, the healthiest and the 
mo1t intelli&en t ,  had died in the trenches a� a result of the mechanical 
and chemical advance s .  Welli �imply asked whence will come the great 
1cientif ic men of the future to coneolidate and continue the technologi­
cal sainJ?115 The LeaClJe thus was necessary if man wa• to 1urvive in 
the faee of hii continued gains . 
The final 4nd perhaps ·major objection to the League which Wells fore-
1aw wa1 the objection from precedent . the view that there had never been 
a Leaaue and 10 there never will be one . The poople who believed this 
W�l'• 1ene:ally narrow in outlook, dieliking the "international" as­
pect• of o Leaaue . Thei·r eenie of patriotism was very great but it was 
not real patriotism but 3 dislike o! interference in the life of the 
nation. 116 Wells pointed out that nationality was not threatened by the 
foi-mat!on of a League but the obsession to power was . This obsession had 
117 �••n built up in the ei;htecnth century by a Machiavellian spirit. 
Welle believed that the world would be a much better place with the power 
ob••••ion deJtreyed. Pride and love for one ' s  country could remain but 
without the power obsession, both were harmless .  
ll5a. G .  weils, � Idea .� �  �eague !1! Nations (�oston, 1919) , P P •  31-32. 
116Ibid . ,  P P •  33·36 .  
117�bid . ,  p .  39.  
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Thus Wells believed that the primary business of the Allies was the 
organization of a League of peace. The League must include Germany as 
that country was the heart of Europe but Wells recognized that true re­
conciliation would not be possible until the present generation died. 118 
Other intellectuals agreed with Wells on the point of the inclusion 
of . Germany in the League. George Bernard Shaw stated that the diffi-
culty in forming the League is not to get all nations into it but to 
keep the incompatible ones out. He believed that the League had to be 
founded on common ideas , institutions , levels of civilization , and phil-
osophies of life. Without the United States, Great Britain, France , and 
Germany the League could not function at all. 119 G .  Lowes Dickinson did 
not believe that the League was necessarily a panacea for the evils of 
war but felt that Germany must be allowed into the League because it was 
not' intended to be a league against Germany . Dickinson stated that if 
Germany was left out, she would intrigue to break up the League. Thus 
120 the menac� to peace would be greater with Germany outside the League. 
Another argument in favor of German entry into the League was voiced 
by Dickinson. He pointed out that if Germany were excluded, the United 
States would not join the League and that Wilson had said as much in a 
22 January 1917 speech to the Senate when he stated that the League was 
to be a new order, not a continuation of the old. 
118 
H . G .  Wells , What Is Coming? (New York: The Macmillan Co . ,  1916) 
pp . 290-293 . 
119G . B .  Shaw, What .!.. Really Wrote About the War (New York: Brentano ' s ,  
1914) , p .  291. 
120G.L .  Dickinson , The Choice Before Us (London : G.  Allen and Unwin, 
1917) , pp. 259-260. 
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The question upon which the whole future peace and 
policy of the world depends is this : Is the present a 
struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new 
balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantte , 
the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a 
tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe , there must be, 
not a balance of power, but a connnunity of power: not 
organized rivalries , but an organized common peace. 121 
Wilson was speaking to an audience that was somewhat hostile to 
his ideas concerning the solution of Europ e ' s  problems . The whole con-
cept of the League was based on control of the power to go to war. Ar-
ticle ten bore the burnt of much criticism on both sides of the ocean 
as it appeared to take away a nation ' s  power to go to war . 
The contracting powers unite in guaranteeing to 
each other political independence and territorial in­
tegrity against external aggression. 
Henry Noel Brailsford recognized this and stated that if the League was 
to work the member states must at least allow disputes to be arbitrated 
before r.esorting to war. This did not mean that states had to give up 
war as a last resort or as an assertion of their own independence but 
that before hostilities actually occurred there would be a moratorium 
for "cooling-off" . 122 
All of the intellectuals had ideas regarding what they felt the 
League had to accomplish. To H .G .  Wells ,  the most important thing the 
League had to do was to halt war. He stated that war had grown out of 
proportion to any good which even the most complete victory could bring. 
This state of affairs came about as a result of the mechanical and che-
121G.L. Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (London: G.  Allen and Unwin , 
1917 ) ,  pp. 260-264 . 
122Brailsford, A League of Nations , pp . 295-297 . 
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mica! advances made in the name of war . Wells used the example of the 
tank to show the danger of what could happen if war was not prohibited. 
The cost of a tank was very high, about forty thousand dollars , 
and the weapon itself was not yet all that useful . Wells foresaw a 
time when, unless war was prohibited, bigger and better (and necessarily 
more expensive) tanks would need to be built. Stores of them would be 
needed and the cost would be enormous. Money · for the tank program would 
have to .be diverted from important social programs and in the long run 
the entire society would suffer. 123 
Wells ' s  speculation proved surprisingly accurate in the 1930 ' s  
when the naval race occurred. More and bigger ships were built by 
Japan, Great Britain, and the United States so that each �ould feel 
secure against the others . This was how the cycle began--it ended with 
World War II. 
Since the issue of neutrality had been one of the motivating f ac­
tors for World War I ,  the intellectuals believed that something needed 
to be done about this rather useless condition. George Bernard Shaw 
believed that the entire concept of neutrality should be discarded by 
the League . Shaw felt that neutrality was absurd as it "assumes that a 
country does not exist with regards to war".  Belgium was neutral in 
1914 but Germany knew she had to get to Paris quickly. To gain passage 
through Belgium, Germany offered to pay and to do no damage. According 
to Shaw, Belgium ' s  refusal to Germany ' s  request became an act of war by 
Belgium on behalf of the Allies . An acceptance of the request would have 
123wells , The Idea of � League , pp . 9-10. 
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been an act of war by Germany against the Allies . Thus by the mere 
request for passage the neutrality of Belgium collapsed. 124 Admit-
tedly Shaw ' s  reasoning is a little weak on the point of Belgium ' s  re-
fusal of passage constituting an act of war unless one understands just 
exactly what neutrality means . Neutrality means that a country will 
not take sides in a war. By definition, neutrality offers no protection 
against attack. Belgium was acting the role of peace-keeper in Europe 
in 1914 � Germany could not attack France without violating Belgium un-
les� she wanted to deal with the Maginot Line. To expect neutrality to 
withstand the realistic problems wrought by war was shortsighted at 
best and disasterous in the long run. 
G .  Lowes Dickinson also believed that neutrality should be abolished 
so that no League member could refuse to take sides against a state 
125 breaking a treaty of the League. Dickinson hoped that the abolition 
of neutrality would act as a deterrent to war. If a state knew that 
when . it· broke a League treaty it would have to face all the members of 
the League aligned against it,  that state might think twice before act-
ing. 
On the issue of nationality some of the intellectuals were in dis-
agreement . Wells believed that the League of Nations was impractical as 
long as it sought to stereotype boundaries and peoples when it was im-
possible to do so.  The societies in the United States and the nations 
of Europe developed quite differently and are constituted quite different-
124shaw, What .!. Wrote, p .  300. 
125c.L.  Dickinson, Problems of International Settlement (London: Pub­
lication for National Peace Council : G .  Allen and Unwin, 1918) , p .  xii. 
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ly. Wells saw Europe as the problem until it would stop thinking in 
terms of nations and unite. 126 The League by stereotyping boundaries 
only exacerbates the problem which already exists.  
H.N.  Brailsford took a different stance. He believed that Europe 
could be saved by nationalism with self-determination as the key to the 
·situation. For example , the people of Alsace were s trongly independent 
and did not want to be either French or German. They could become an 
Alsatian state by being established as a neutral under the protection 
127 of the League thus ending one of the most prominent feuds in Europe. 
At first glance this seems to be a workable solution but problems soon 
spring to mind . This new Alsatian state was to be neutral at a time when 
the concept of neutrality was under attack. However ,  Alsace practically 
would have to be neutral if peace was to be maintained for the Alsatian 
population would contain both German and French elements . Unless the 
League was extremely strong, the most prominent feud in Europe would 
not be over . 
Brailsford was a true believer in self determination, feeling that 
free votes should determine which way disputed areas should go with re­
gards to nationality. 128 These free votes would then be accepted by the 
world as the will of the people and the will of the League. 
If the League was to uphold its will for the good of the world it 
had to have real power.  Shaw felt the League must have first-rate 
126wells , Salvaging of Civilization, pp. 64-65 . 
127Brailsford, A League of Nations , p .  135 .  
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armament if it was to survive against the League of War . 129 Brailsford 
believed that there was no better first-rate armament than the British 
navy and that it should be turned over to the League as its main force 
against aggression. Brailsford saw that if the British navy were left 
outside the j urisdiction of the League , that body ' s  decisions would bear 
130 no weight. 
�his is what � . G .  Wells feared . He stated that the League was in-
adequate because it had no representative sanctions , no military forces , 
and no real authority. Wells said: 
People have a way of saying it (the League) is better 
than nothing . But it may be worse than nothing. It may 
create a feeling of disillusiorunent about world-unifying 
efforts. 131 
As an example of this kind of faulty reasoning Wells. related the 
story about a mad elephant in a garden. If one wants· to be rid of the 
elephant he must give the gardener an adequate weapon. To give him a 
rook-rifle. say it ' s  better than nothing , and encourage him to face the 
elephant is a good way to get rid of the gardener . 132 The League of 
Nations without sUf ficient means of force will also fall before its own 
mad elephant .  
The intellectuals did not debate only what the League should do but 
also what type of organization it should be. All were not in agreement 
as to the concept after which the League should be modelled . George 
129shaw , What .!. Wrote, p .  80. 
130Brailsford, A League of Nations , pp . 200-201 . 
l31wells,  Salvaging E!_ Civilization, p .  14 . 
132Ibid . 
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Bernard Shaw viewed the League as the crux of the Fourteen Points--a 
group of nations constituting a trusteeship of peace. The important 
word for Shaw was nations ; the League was not to be a federation of 
133 man. Shaw was being somewhat less idealistic than some of his in-
tellectual conpatriots who saw the League as a unique achievement for 
mankind--something which would promote brotherhood throughout the world. 
Shaw stated that the League must not be "conceived as a Tolstoyan cele­
bration� but as a very vigorous organization of resistance to evi l . 11134 
Shaw realized that the old dangers were still present in the world and 
so relied on a strong League to wdel.d the power to keep the peace. He 
believed that the League would function best if it were organized in 
much the same way as the United States ; that is , one maj or power arising 
from a conglomeration of smaller states. 135 The United States had risen 
from small disparate segments to become the most powerful nation in the 
world . Certainly the League could bring together disparate nations to 
become the most powerful force in the world. However , Shaw realized 
that before this could be done each nation would have to put its own 
house in order. The League would be concerned primarily with interna-
tional affairs , not domestic affairs. 
H . G .  Wells disagreed with Shaw on this point. He believed that 
the League of Nations had the ability to create a "new world" ,  a world 
136 government exercising world control. Wells was not in favor of the 
133shaw , What .!. Wrote, p .  289 . 
134Ibid . ,  p .  273 . 
135Ibid . ,  p .  290. 
136wells , Salvaging Ef Civilization, p .  15.  
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League of Nations because of what it was inherently--a league consisting 
of nations . This , he believed, could only lead to further conflict and 
ultimately war . Wells wanted a league of mankind , a force which would 
137 transcend national boundaries and petty obsessions . The League would 
then be a promoter of world-wide brotherhood and peace would be much 
easier to maintain. 
G .  Lowes Dickinson agreed with Wells . He stated that the League 
could not and would not work unless a new spirit came over the govern-
ments and peoples . The League was to be this new spirit but it must not 
be allowed to become an instrument of the old power policies. 138 
Wells believed that world peace could come about because of the 
will for a "world law under a .world government". This world government 
would in essence ·.create a world league of men thus transcending a mere 
139 League of Nations. Wells did not feel that a mere League of Nations 
wpuld work because the project of a world-wide league was a little too 
much . for complete American participation and not enough to meet the 
needs of Europe. Thus the idea of a true world state, although a more 
.
.
. 
idealistic proj ect , would be a much sounder proposition. l40 
Wells had very definite ideas as to how this world state should be 
established and what it needed to be successful . He realized that 
national chauvinism must be contained and that patriotism mus t be en-
137wells , Salvaging � Civilization, p .  7 7 .  
138G . L .  Dickinson, Causes of International War (London: Swarthmore 
Press , 1920) ,  p .  91 . 
139wells � Outline of History, pp . 583-584. 
140wells, Salvaging of Civilization , p .  49.  
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larged to th� concept of a world state. The common aim of world peace 
would be enough to bring this unification about . 141 The best place to 
start in order to release mankind from the bonds of nationalistic ob-
session was with the children. The means would be a little truthful 
history , something which Wells found sadly lacking in contemporary edu­
cation. 142 
Once all this had been achieved and war had been eradicated from 
the world, the League of Nations could begin to pursue more cultural 
aims,  thus producing "ennobled individuals whose city is the world11 • 143 
This was to be,  in Wells ' s  estimation , the true role of the League . 
The world awoke after the outbreak of war in 1914 to a new system of 
realities antagonistic to national states. The national quests for 
power had ended in world-wide war which could truly destroy nations . 
Wells believed that the case for the League of Nations rested here. 
The League would achieve peace and then act as a coordinator of human 
affairs. 144 Such things as war would then be impossible and man could 
truly prosper and fulfill his destiny. 
141 Wells,  Salvaging of Civilization, p .  71.  
142 Ibid . , pp. 74-75. 
143wells, Idea of a League, p. 44 .  
144 Ibid . ,  pp. 5-6 . 
CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
The intellectuals of Great Britain did not , in most cases, fit 
into the same mold of thinking as their countrymen . While most English­
men were appalled by Germany ' s  actions , the intellectuals , for the most 
part, tried to view both sides in a logical and reasonable manner .  G .  
K .  Chesterton did not fit in with the other intellectuals but was im­
portant because he adequately represented the views of the average 
Englishman . Chesterton ' s  characteristic overs tatement was more than 
counterbalanced by the other intellectuals , most especially George 
Bernard Shaw. 
With the understanding of the inclusion of Chesterton as a foil , 
the similarity of views of the rest of the intellectuals becomes more 
apparent. Shaw, Dickinson, Russell , and Wells saw neutrality as unrealis­
tic as well as foolhardy. They held little sympathy for Belgium, viewing 
her demise as a fortune of war . Thus Germany was not to be condemned 
simply for violating neutral Belgium. The war had come about as the 
result of the machinations of both sides ; thus blame could not be ap­
portioned to only one side. 
Both Shaw and Wells agreed concerning the importance of the tech­
nological advances as they changed the essential character of war . The 
advent of the tank, the submarine , the machine-gun , and poison gas had 
an overwhelming effect on the old rules of war . All these weapons 
69 
7 0  
changed the essential character o f  war as they were instruments o f  
sudden death on a massive scale. For example, mounting an old-style 
full-scale charge with thousands of men against well-fortified machine­
gun emplacements was not only foolhardy , it was disasterous . The old 
rules of war could not keep pace with the new weapons of war . 
Once the war was over the real disagreements among the intellectuals 
began. Mos t  of the thinkers agreed that Germany had to be included in 
any post-war organization but what that organization was to accomplish 
and by what means was not agreed upon. 
Germany was to be included in any post-war League of Nations or she 
would intrigue to break it up as the Germans could only view the League 
as an alliance against them. When it turned out that Germany was to be 
punished , many voices spoke out. Austin Harrison and George Bernard 
Shaw voiced their anger over the continued Ailied blockade of Germany 
after 11 November. Henry Noel Brailsford travelled in Germany and re­
por�ed on the mood of the people after the war. He saw the dissatis­
faction which unscrupulous men would capitalize on to rise to power. 
Perhaps the major theme Hitler used in his rise was war-guilt but 
the ramifications of Article 231, the war-guilt clause, were best ex­
hibited by the issue of reparations . John Maynard Keynes was the intel­
lectual most concerned with this aspect as he sa� the dangers inherent 
in wholesale reparation demands .  
The main disagreements between the intellectuals arose over what 
the League of Nations should be as well as what it should do . Most intel­
lectuals agreed that the League must halt war but they could not agree 
on the problem of nationality. H .G .  Wells believed that nationalism was 
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the bane of the world and that if left untouched it would destroy 
Europe. H.N.  Brailsford believed that a principle of nationality was 
necessary if stability was to be achieved . Thus the people of the 
maj or areas of contention (i. e . , Alsace,  Danzig, etc . )  would be allowed 
self-determination in order to decide their national allegiance. It is 
easy to see how this continuation of nationalism could conceivably lead 
again to war if a maj or power decided to try to influence the plebis-
cite in an area of contention. 
Regarding what the League of Nations should be H . G .  Wells voiced 
the opinion that the League should be a league of men as opposed to a 
true League of Nations as Shaw and others wanted . Nationality would be 
superceded by a world league of men as all h�manity would be united by 
the common bond of peace. Thus it would be possiole to escape the des­
truction of future war s .  All of the intellectuals agreed that a new 
war had to be avoided at all costs. The utter destructiveness of the 
war h�d had its most telling effect on the men who fought in it.  
However , the term "lost generation" applied just as  readily to  those 
who were physically maimed or psychologically scarred by the violence 
as it did to those eight m.illion who died as a result of the conflict. 
This was what caused the intellectuals to shift from the optimism of 
the first decade of the twentieth century to the pessimism of the 
1920' s--the terrible toll which the war took in lives,  material, and 
social advancement. 
H . G .  Wells noted in his Outline of History that hundreds of possible 
Newtons , Darwins , and Bacons died unfulfilled in the trenches . 145 This 
145wells, Outline � History, pp . 588-589. 
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was perhaps the greatest tragedy of the war , the worst atrocity, the 
greatest crime against humanity--the terrible waste of human life. 
Thomas Gray penned best these sentiments in a more peaceful time in his 
"Elegy" . 
Here rests his head upon the lap of Earth 
A youth, to Fortune and to Fame unknown; 
Fair Science frown'd not on his humble birth 
And Melancholy mark'd him for her own. 
APPENDIX A 
excerpt from 
OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
(From The Nation of the 7th November 1914) 
Sir I petition you to invite the Neutral Powers to confer with the 
United States of America for the purpose of requesting Britain, France ,  
and Germany to withdraw from the soil of Belgium and fight out their 
quarrel ·on their own territories. However the sympathies of the neu- · 
tral States may be divided , and whatever points now at issue between 
the belligerent armies have no right to be in Belgium, much less to 
fight in Belgium and involve the innocent inhabitants of that country 
in their reciprocal slaughter. You will not question my right to ad­
dress this petition to you. You are the official head of the nation 
that is beyond all question chief of the Neutral Powers , marked out 
by commanding magnitude ,  by modern democratic constitution, and by 
freedom from the complication of monarchy and its traditions , which have 
led Europe into the quaint absurdity of a war waged formally between the 
German Kaiser, the German Tsar, the German King of the Belgians , 
the German King of England , the German Emperor of Austria, and a gentle­
man who .shares with you the distinction of not being related to any of 
them, and is therefore describable monarchially as one Poincare, a 
Frenchman • • • •  
Now that this mischief has been done , and the two European thunder 
clouds have met and are discharging their lightnings , it is not for me 
to meddle with the question whether the United States should take a side 
in their warfare as far as it concerns themselves alone. But I may 
plead for a perfectly innocent neutral State, the State of Belgium, which 
is being ravaged in a horrible manner by the belligerents . Her surviving 
population is flying into all the neighboring countries to escape from 
the incessant hail of shrapnel and howitzer shells from British cannon, 
French cannon, German Cannon, and , most tragic of all, the Belgian can­
non; for the Belgian army is being forced to devas tate its own country in 
its own defence. 
For this there can be. no excuse; and at such a horror the rest of 
the world cannot look on in silence without incurring the guilt of the 
bystander who witnesses a crime without even giving the alarm. I grant 
that Belgium, in her extreme peril, made one mistake . She called to her 
aid the Powers of the Entente alone instead of calling on the whole world 
of kindly men. She should have called on America, too; and it is hard to 
see how you could in honor have disregarded. that call. But if Belgium 
says nothing , but only turns her eyes dumbly towards you whilst you 
look at the red ruin into which her villages , her heaps of slain, her 
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monuments and treasures,  are being hurled by her friends and enemies 
alike, are you any the less bound to speak out than if Belgium had asked 
you to lend her a million soldiers? . . •  I am thinking of other things : 
of the honest Belgians , whom I have seen nursing their wounds , and whom 
I recognize at a glance as plain men, innocent of all warlike intentions , 
trusting to the wisdom and honesty of the rulers and diplomatists who 
have betrayed them, taken from their farms and their businesses to des­
troy and be destroyed for no goodp.irpose that might not have been achie­
ved better and sooner by neighborly means . I am thinking of the authentic 
news that no papers dare publish, not of the lies they all publish to 
divert your attention from the truth . In America these things can be 
said without driving American mothers and wives mad : here, we have to 
set our ;eeth and go forward . We cannot be just:  we cannot see beyond 
the range of our guns . The roar of the shrapnel deafens us ; the black 
smoke of the howitzer blinds our imaginations.  For justice, we must do 
as the medieval cities did: call in a s tranger .  You are not altogether 
that to us; but you can look at all of us impartially. And you are the 
spokesman of Western Democracy .  That is why I appeal_ to you. 
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